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4 SEPTEMBER 1987

WEST EUROPE

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DENMARK

POLITICAL

CHRISTIAN PARTY WANTS END TO NATO FIRST-USE DOCTRINE

New Security Policy Program

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 2 Jul 87 pp 1, 14

[Article by Jorgen Dragsdahl: "Christian People's Party Wants NATO's Nuclear Strategy Changed"]

[Text] Denmark will work for a change in the doctrine of first-use of nuclear weapons.

The Christian People's Party has adopted a new defense and security policy program that sharply breaks with the attitude of the other governing parties on the use of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy.

In the program it says that Denmark must "work for NATO giving up the right to the first-use of nuclear weapons and develop its general strategy accordingly."

The program was adopted at a meeting of the executive committee 13 June, but it has not yet been printed, and the party has therefore itself not yet become aware of the change.

Greater Credibility

The formulation is a sharpening of a draft that was discussed at the meeting. In its most recent issue, the party's organ, IDE POLITIK, has a discussion of the new program, but on this point the report used a softer formulation, which was rejected upon a motion to amend.

The chairman of the party's defense committee, Christian Bjerre, says that the basis for the formulation selected is that "if we work for the relinquishment of the right to first-use, then efforts for NATO's double goal, the prevention of war and a relaxation of tensions, will have greater credibility."

The Folketing, in its famous "3 May agenda," agreed that Denmark would work against the first-use of nuclear Weapons -- that is, as an answer to a purely conventional attack. But at that time none of the governing parties voted for it. In fact, the Foreign Office has done nothing to change NATO's strategy--

in spite of encouragement from the Folketing.

It is NATO's strategy today that nuclear weapons will be used even if the enemy in a conflict still has not done so. This strategy has been exposed to harsh criticism by, among others, American defense experts and the church community. The Warsaw Pact has declared it will refrain from first-use.

Solitary

Christian Bjerre recognizes that the party with its new program is making a solitary approach without the other governing parties. "But it is a goal, and I do not see any direct disagreement. How the program will be interpreted in practical politics is up to the Folketing group," he said.

The party also favors "a significant reduction of both tactical and middle distance nuclear weapons, because it will benefit relaxation of tensions and security. Denmark should use its influence to see this realized as soon as possible."

In the first draft of the program, abstinence from first-use was connected to this reduction. In the international debate one has meanwhile argued that abstinence from first-use is a necessary step if significant cutbacks in the arsenal are to take place, as the alliance must change its dependence upon nuclear weapons. The chosen, sharper formulation brings the party into agreement with this line of argument.

Compromise

Christian Bjerre says that the new defense program is a compromise between various viewpoints in the party, which have been united in a more cohesive program than before.

Conflict With Coalition Partners

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 3 Jul 87 p 12

[Article by Jorgen Dragsdahl: "Danish Initiatives In NATO For New Nuclear Strategy Must Wait Until After Elections"]

[Text] Split between governing parties concerning first-use of nuclear weapons.

Even if the Christian People's Party now favors a change in NATO strategy to exclude first-use of nuclear weapons, it will have no practical consequences this side of the elections.

The Social Democratic security policy spokesman, Lasse Budtz, expects elections to be called in connection with the opening of the Folketing in October, and he does not believe, therefore, that the government can be pushed into action before then.

Possible Danish initiatives must also be coordinated with the Norwegian government, which wants to wait with an initiative until after the Storting debate, which will probably take place during the fall or in the beginning of 1988, Norway's foreign minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, said Thursday at a press conference in Copenhagen.

INFORMATION could report Thursday that the Christian People's Party has adopted a new defense program which says that Denmark must "work for NATO's giving up the right to first-use of nuclear weapons and forming its own strategy accordingly."

This position is in conflict with the other governing party policies. They are sticking to the present alliance strategy with its so-called "flexible response." No representatives of the governing parties wanted to comment on the apparent split, because they want to wait for the publication of the whole program.

New Situation

The Socialist People's Party's security policy spokesman, Pelle Voigt, thinks that the change in the Christian People's Party means that the security policy majority's position in this matter is being "activated," so that Danish initiatives will appear in the UN and in NATO. The Folketing has agreed several times that Denmark must work for a ban on first-use, but the government has ignored the demand.

He thinks that abstinence from first-use will be a confidence-creating initiative, and that it is particularly important now when there are prospects of real nuclear disarmament.

Lasse Budtz said that this is "quite clearly" a new situation if the Christian People's Party will live up its program, but "I doubt it," Budtz said. In his opinion the party "is falling between two stools here."

Before the elections are called, the Danish delegation at the UN must have a directive for its conduct at the fall general assembly. The Folketing majority demanded earlier that Denmark should work in the UN against first-use, but last year the Social Democratic Party accepted the fact that the demand was not lived up to. The explanation was that Norway did not want to go along, because in Oslo one thinks that an initiative must be taken in NATO.

During the press conference Thursday, Norway's foreign minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, said that on 15 May he had given the Storting an account of the Social Democratic government's desires for a change in NATO's strategy that eliminated first-use. The government would like to take this up formally in NATO. But "the most important thing is that we first get this report discussed in the Storting, and this can happen this fall or early in 1988, Stoltenberg said.

He has discussed the Norwegian view with NATO's general secretary and the American secretary of defense -- "without receiving overwhelming support," Stoltenberg added.

Lasse Budtz says that there has been no sign in the security policy discussions in the Ostergaard committee that the governing parties will support the majority view on NATO strategy.

DENMARK

MILITARY

ARMY'S NEW INSPECTOR GENERAL: FORCES IN POOR CONDITION

Copenhagen DET FRI AKTUELT in Danish 7 Jul 87 p 4

[Text] The new in Army inspector General, Major General J.C. Essemann, is concerned about both the quantity and quality of the Danish Army. Denmark's Army today is less than 20 percent of what the other Nordic countries can show, he pointed out in an article in the newspaper, HAERNYT.

As for quality, parts of the Army are worse than what the Warsaw Pact units can show. At best the Danish Army will only be able to accomplish its tasks with very significant losses.

"It is thought-provoking," he continued, "that the Army's share of the national budget today makes up 2.8 percent, while up to 9 April 1940 it made up 6.5 percent, and that both peace and war strength relative to the size of the population at that time was greater than today."

9124

CSO: 3613/112

LEFTIST FOLKETING MP ASKS IF ISLAND INCLUDED IN NORDIC ZONE

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 15 Jul 87 p 6

Folketing member Pelle Voigt (Socialist People's Party) finds it strange that the government does not immediately support the Greenland government's wish for a guarantee of Greenland as a nuclear weapons free zone. He has therefore asked Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal Party) to answer the following question:

"What form, duration, and effectiveness has the pledge with the force of international law created in the discussions in Washington to insure that the Folketing's resolution of 8 February 1968, which demands absolute guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be stored in Greenland and that Greenland's air space will be kept a nuclear weapons free zone, is permanently binding on the U.S.?"

If one is to believe Disarmament Minister K. Helwig Petersen's reply to Folketing member Kai Moltke of 15 June 1968 (doc. 4009), the U.S. is supposed in 1968 to have given Denmark a pledge with the force of international law that the Greenland area would be held free of nuclear weapons and that the air space would be held as a nuclear weapons free zone, Pelle Voigt said among other things in his justification for the question.

He points out that this was adopted in the Folketing in pursuance of a resolution 8 February 1968 at the suggestion of Folketing member Per Haekkerup.

"If Greenland had already become nuclear weapons free at that time on the basis of international law with the concession of the "absolute guarantees" demanded by the Folketing at that time from the U.S., it seems strange that the government today does not openly support the Greenland government's wish to guarantee Greenland as a nuclear weapons free zone," Voigt added.

"Therefore the Folketing must have clear information on what form of absolute and binding guarantees on the basis of international law have been given this time by the U.S., and whether these are constantly in force.

Therefore there is a desire for a clarification of, among other things, whether "the results of the discussions in Washington," which the minister referred to in his answer, have the form of an exchange of notes, a memorandum, an addition to the defense agreement of 1951, or something else, and whether the result is still binding in international law today, Per Voigt concluded.

ISLAND'S LEADING NEWSPAPER: U.S. ARROGANT IN FAEROES ACTION

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 15 Jul 87 p 10

[Editorial] "Justified Anger"

[Text] The big brother of us all in NATO, the U.S., has again acted with an arrogance that is beyond all attempts to describe. Not that there is anything new in this attitude the U.S. showed during last week's fleet visit in Torshavn in the Faeroes. There was only an underscoring of an attitude that is already well-known from similar occasions.

The situation was that the Faeroese government wanted information about the armament on board an American warship. Were there nuclear weapons on board?

The answer both from the U.S. and from the Danish Foreign Office consisted of the usual, stereotyped declaration: We do not inform about this!

Here we have, therefore, the relationship in the Western defense alliance in a nutshell!

The reaction among all peace-loving people must be the very simple: "What do I need enemies for, when I have these kinds of friends?"

We have noticed the declarations that are sent out when the other super power, the Soviet Union, sends its warships on a visit to other countries. The declarations are always formulated as assurances that there are no nuclear weapons on board the vessels.

Naturally they are declarations that we have no earthly chance of verifying, but they still show that one knows here how guests are supposed to behave themselves properly.

It is a completely justified anger that the American arrogance has caused in the Faeroes. The Faeroese position deserves every possible support.

9124

CSO: 3613/114

POLL SHOWS KOIVISTO, HOLKERI ENJOY VOTER POPULARITY

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 22 Jun 87 p 2

[Text] Finns are satisfied with President Mauno Koivisto and Prime Minister Harri Holkeri. But they are dissatisfied with Center Party chairman Paavo Vayrynen. This was shown by a Gallup poll published in the Uleaborg newspaper KALEVA on Friday.

Some 67 percent of the population said they were satisfied with President Koivisto. The current president's popularity is stable; a similar poll from last year showed that 66 percent of the respondents supported Koivisto then.

The survey, conducted by the Finnish Gallup firm at KALEVA's request, indicates that Mauno Koivisto has gained new supporters, especially among young and middle-aged people. Some 13 percent of young people and 12 percent of middle-aged Finns said they were very satisfied with the president in KALEVA's poll last year. This year the figures were 18 and 17 percent.

Koivisto's popularity has also increased among Social Democrats; a year ago 24 percent of the Social Democrats surveyed were very satisfied with him, this year the figure is 41 percent.

Prime Minister Harri Holkeri's conduct had the support of 55 percent of the population. However it is worth noting that one out of five of those surveyed could not express an opinion about Holkeri, while this figure was as low as 3 percent where Koivisto was concerned.

6578

CSO: 3650/178

COUNTRY'S LEADING PAPER REPORTS ON SKP MAJORITY CONGRESS

Gorbachev Spirit in Evidence

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 11 Jun 87 p 10

[Article: "SKP Tastes Self-Criticism; Majority Tries to Persuade Stalinists and Contemplates Future Changes of Leadership"]

[Text] The Finnish Communist Party (SKP) cautiously tasted Gorbachev-style self-criticism provoked by its chairman, Arvo Aalto, at the party congress that began on Friday. Fretting about their own mistakes is, however, so new to the SKP that the congress delegates were still timid about lashing out at themselves.

Aside from sparing themselves, the moderates also spared the Stalinists who had resigned from the party and whom they tried to persuade to return to their ranks. There were also inklings among the delegates of cautious wishes to change party leaders at some later point.

Representing the CPSU at the congress, Estonian party leader Karl Vaino also expressed the hope that there would be a peaceful settlement of disputes among the Communists. With the exception of Bulgaria, the ruling parties of Eastern Europe sent higher-level delegates as guests of the SKP than they did to the Stalinist congress held a week ago.

Not Aping Gorbachev

Aside from being self-critical, the activity report presented to the Central Committee by Aalto was markedly soft-toned in the opinion of the Stalinists. Aalto reminded his listeners that at the last congress they had assigned themselves the task of restoring the SKP to a state of normalcy. "We have done so."

Right after that, Aalto remarked that "the party needs your ideas, your initiatives, your creativity and your action."

In Aalto's opinion, the continuous decline in support [for the party] has forced the congress "to examine party activities in a rigorously critical way." Aalto suggested that the party itself was a scapegoat for the decline in support.

Afterwards Aalto said that the SKP is in exceptionally great need of self-criticism because exercising it only became possible once the party's internal tension had been relieved. Aalto noted that self-examination should not be understood to mean aping Gorbachevism.

In other respects Aalto took the same tack as before. For example, he described Finland as pursuing a "peaceful foreign policy," even though the party acknowledges in its papers that it is a supporter of "an active, peace-seeking neutrality policy."

Replace Leaders

Arvi Hakkarainen of Keski-Suomi went even farther in seeking peace with the Stalinists. He urged that after the health-restoring operation they seek out people in the party who look beyond the division between the two factions and try to unite the masses.

"They are waiting for these measures widely throughout the rank and file. If the current leadership is incapable of doing this, it must be replaced," Hakkarainen lamented the fact and sketched a program for the party "that will provide new impetus for this outdated party."

Pekka Leppanen, another delegate from Keski-Suomi, took a different tack. "We have performed a necessary operation on a cancer in the party. The competitive party that has taken shape within the SKP is no longer interfering with our work."

Viljo Maatta of Pohjois-Karjala urged the delegates to look farther ahead as concerns the election of leaders. He would like to raise the question of who are to be chosen to lead the party in sufficient time for future congresses.

Consideration of replacing Aalto or first secretary Esko Vainionpaa was blocked this time by the fact that such replacements would easily be interpreted as a judgment on their having expelled the Stalinists.

Pentti Kirkkola of Etela-Hame asked whether the SKP was capable of demonstrating that there is room for different people and opinions in the party. He supported reelection of the current leaders, but demanded of them measures by means of which the party would be rid of its internal lack of vitality.

Vaino Conveyed Greetings on Behalf of CPSU

Of the affiliated party representatives, the congress delegates listened most attentively to Vaino, who presented the CPSU Central Committee's greetings to "the 21st Finnish Communist Congress."

A week ago Central Committee alternate member P. Slezko delivered the "Soviet Communists'" greetings to the Stalinists alone. Unlike the party organ, PRAVDA, Slezko did not refer to the meeting as the "21st Congress."

Vaino urged the moderates to make an effort to unite [Communist] forces. Slezko's greetings to the Stalinists were nearly the same in terms of content.

The greetings Vaino presented in the name of the CPSU Central Committee were to be interpreted as a sign that the CPSU expects the Stalinists to make the first move.

In conclusion of his address, Vaino went and shook the hands of Aalto and the other members of the chairmanship.

Aside from Vaino, only a member of the GDR Communist Party Politburo clearly raised the issue of the division on Friday, while the representatives of Hungary and France quietly bypassed the issue. A representative of the Chinese party was also present after an interval of over 20 years.

Beloved Comrade Aalto

The Culture House congress was like a Sunday school picnic this time as compared with the last congress. Old activists paced the corridors idly, complaining that they had nothing to do.

One of the rare flashes of color was Paula Grekela of the Oulu District, who announced that Oulu members endorse "beloved Comrade Aalto's" continuing as the head of the party. Grekela in glowing terms described how Aalto, like Kim Il Sung, "has lighted the way for us."

Cuban Revolution rhythms played by a rhythm group introduced a bit of life into the quiet assembly. A telegram extending greetings from West Coast recreational fishermen also deviated from the gray picture presented by the congress.

Paper on Koivisto Candidacy

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 11 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Kivisto's 'New' Front"]

[Text] The SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] recently postponed nominating Gov Kalevi Kivisto to run as a presidential candidate. The reason given for the postponement was the broad movement in favor of Kivisto, one that surpasses the usual limits of support for the SKDL. The SKDL has eagerly seized on the opportunity to create a new front around Kivisto.

The veil of secrecy thrown over Kivisto's new political front was breached when the delegation that had asked Kivisto to be a candidate stepped into the public limelight. A list containing nearly 160 names of scientists and important persons in the world of culture who support Kivisto has now also been published.

The biggest surprise on the list is a slight disappointment. Any presidential candidate at all would be proud of these names that back Kivisto for president.

However, most of the supporters of Kivisto's new front are traditional SKDL supporters and well-known leftists who had even before this revealed their positions on issues. Among them are some unexpected names from other political camps, but they are so few that the talk of a new front is an exaggeration.

The fact is interesting that known supporters of Koivisto have not deserted him to back Kivisto, even though the nature of the government coalition has decisively changed.

This does not, however, lessen Kivisto's importance as a candidate. As early as during the last elections, he conducted a good campaign. Now more clearly than the last time, Kivisto appears to be a real alternative who is farther to the Left than Koivisto. He lays emphasis on soft values, idealism, intellectuality and adopting serious attitudes toward one's political future. And he is not promising to indirectly support Koivisto as openly as he did last time either.

Kivisto is thus raising himself to the pinnacle of the temple. His ability to gobble up support for Koivisto among those who vote Left will have a most important effect on whether the president's name will be decisive even in an outright national referendum or not.

SKP Factions' Stands Compared

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 11 Jun 87 p 2

[Commentary by HELSINGIN SANOMAT article editor Risto Uimonen: "Communists' Leadership Problems"]

[Text] Nowadays the nation has the honor of seeing for itself from week to week how fewer and fewer Finnish Communists are electing leaders for themselves. The Stalinists have already crowned Taisto Sinisalo. The traditional SKP will give Arvo Aalto a bunch of bright red roses at the end of next week.

The humming and praise nevertheless will have the same sort of hollow ring in Culture House as they did at the Stalinist congress in Dipoli. This is how it will happen only because this is how it has to happen. There are no other alternatives even though they would like there to be others.

In fact a sizable leadership crisis is undermining the whole Finnish Communist and People's Democratic movement behind the scenes. Not a single leader's position is undisputed. Aalto and Sinisalo are paralyzed by the party dispute. The most ardent Stalinist no longer believes in Kristiina Halkola. In the SKDL they are thinking about what should be done with a problem called Esko Helle. The smallest problem there is Jouko Kajanoja's presidential candidacy: That will take just a minute to resolve.

Arvo Aalto's rise to the leadership of the SKP took place late as a result of a Third Line coup. But when he finally acceded to power, Aalto did what he had to do: He expelled the Stalinists so that the dispute would not tear the SKP to pieces.

The moderates are genuinely grateful to Aalto for this. They consider it to be a great political feat. But necessity has now become a burden to Aalto. In the long run, the symbol of the split has no future as the leader of the party. A new ascendance and unification of the SKP, which most of them still long for, cannot happen as long as Aalto is the leader of the party.

Aalto cannot, however, be cast aside just like that. The logic of politics prevents them from doing that: If they were to replace the chairman this soon, that would also be an admission of the failure of the reform policy. So Member of Parliament Esko Seppanen's motion that Aalto make way for a new man at this point remains a voice crying in the wilderness, although it does largely reflect the feelings of party members.

Sinisalo occupies the top Stalinist post by virtue of the same logic that applies to a mushroom. But will the old party dispute keep him and Aalto from being deposed for the entire party congress term, 3 years? According to SKP rules, the election of a chairman is a matter for the Central Committee, not the party congress. It would be no surprise if there were to be changes even before the 3-year period expires.

Sinisalo's position is more precarious. A tendency to want to cooperate [with the moderates], already evident at the Stalinist congress, was a warning signal. But Sinisalo paid no heed to it, instead plodding along the same old course. His speech too was so long that one could have driven by car from Helsinki to Jyvaskyla before it was over. Where else in Finland does one still have to listen to one old man hold forth without pause for so long?

The CPSU is now experiencing Gorbachevism, but Aalto is still a devotee of Brezhnev and Sinisalo exudes old-style Stalinism. Sinisalo is sustained by his special relationship with the USSR. But how long will it keep Esko-Juhani Tennila and other reform-minded activists from breaking away?

A year from now it will be dentist Esko Helle's turn to be rated at the SKDL congress on his term as chairman. They wound up with him at the time because no other acceptable socialists were then available. He is, however, proving to be a poor choice. Pressures to replace the chairman are now so great that it would be a wonder if they did otherwise.

Stalinists Again Expelled

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Jun 87 p 10

[Article by Kyosti Karvonen; first paragraph is HELSINGIN SANOMAT introduction]

[Text] The moderate congress has shifted to further discussion of a controversial revision of the rules.

On Saturday evening the 21st SKP Congress submitted to the wishes of the "nonsocialist Right" and once again expelled from the party those Stalinist district organizations that had been booted out and, just to be sure, also the Stalinist cells as well as the municipal and local organizations.

The Rules Committee quickly introduced for passage by the congress a motion for a resolution that would approve a reiteration of the expulsion of the Stalinists from the moderate SKP.

The swift resolution, which was swept out from under others by changing the congress agenda, is linked with the decision rendered last Thursday by the

Helsinki Court of Appeals. According to it, the rules revision approved by the SKP special congress in 1985 was null and void because of a formal error.

Through the rules revision, in addition to giving the congress the right to expel party districts, the moderates also gave that right to the Central Committee, which indeed took advantage of the revision to expel those districts controlled by the Stalinists. The lower-level organizations were expelled last summer.

According to the new decision on the expulsions, the congress delegates knew before the congress was held that the expulsion of the Stalinist district municipal and local organizations was to be discussed at the congress. According to SKP information secretary Oiva Bjorkback, a letter on the matter was sent to the delegates beforehand.

Dispute May Continue

The decision scarcely, however, means that the dispute over the expulsions is at an end, since the Stalinists are applying for permission from a higher court to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals. The moderates are also launching an appeal.

It is possible that the Stalinists will appeal the Court of Appeals decision on the grounds of the congress' Saturday resolution on the expulsions as well. An attempt to prolong the dispute would be behind this.

Stiffening of the dispute would indirectly strengthen current SKP chairman Arvo Aalto's positions since a change of leaders in the midst of everything else might be interpreted as meaning that the policy pursued with respect to the Stalinists since 1984 under his leadership was felt to be a mistake by the moderates.

There have been glimpses of cautious criticism of the party leadership in congress speeches and it has been indicated that, if the party leader is not replaced now, his time will come, sooner or later.

Most Critical Speech Was Not Delivered

Pohjois-Karjala District's Esko Turunen, who attacked the district secretary in particular with a sledgehammer in the copies of his speech that were handed out, had promised to come up with the sharpest criticism on Saturday. He was of the opinion that, at the rate it is going, the SKP is moving into an underground period, into its grave.

For some reason Turunen did not deliver his speech and the handout version was removed.

Reijo Viitala of Lapland proceeded along the line of self-criticism instituted by Aalto on Friday. "When a large number of these B-group people appear to be of the opinion that the Conservative Party will handle their affairs better than we Communists will, it's time for us to look at ourselves in the mirror," Viitala said.

Paulina Murto-Lehtinen of Helsinki complained that the Communists are excluding themselves from party activities.

"We are quick to say that resident associations and peace groups are make-work activities and that senior citizen associations and municipal district associations are nonsocialist foolishness. And then recently there have been these single-issue movements engineered by the Greens. [And we say] that we are carefully keeping out of all this," Murto-Lehtinen marveled.

Hilkka Pulkkinen of Kainuu analyzed the course of her own life. She said that her generation was used to getting its positions on issues ready-made, which is why forming one's own opinion is a painful process.

"But we take care of practical tasks conscientiously; we downright rush into them. As a child, I firmly believed that the more one criticized the nonsocialists, the better a communist one was," Pulkkinen recalled.

Heli Astala of Varsinais-Suomi, on the other hand, has not lost her childhood faith: "In how many of you good comrades' eyes do I not see the glow that also lights our party? I see the tenderness that glows in the eyes of every revolutionary."

Rules Revision Shelved

On Saturday evening the congress also reached a decision on the basis of which the rules revision that had given rise to the dispute was shelved in committee until the next congress. The 1957 rules, on which the congress had also based its decision to expel the Stalinist districts, are still in effect.

The committee that drafted the changes in the rules had made a proposal that would have for all practical purposes transferred power from the Central Committee to the Politburo and given the congress instead of the Central Committee the right to choose the party's top leaders.

The SKP Politburo supported the rules revision, but the proposal got no farther than the hesitant Central Committee and the Rules Committee, which took a different view of the matter. The rules revision would turn the Central Committee into a sort of party council and the Politburo into a party committee.

So the candidate nominations on Sunday will follow the same old course. The congress will first choose a Central Committee, which will then choose a Politburo, with Aalto as chairman, Esko Vainionpää as first secretary and Helja Tammisola as vice chairwoman. Member of Parliament Arvo Kempainen is pushing hardest for the post of second vice chairman.

The Central Committee gallery of faces will probably include a fair number of new ones and more women. We may also expect a small amount of new blood in the Politburo.

Kivisto's Return Has Begun

Gov Kalevi Kivisto (People's Democrat), who has set out to be the presidential candidate of various groups of citizens, launched his return to politics by speaking at the SKP evening celebration.

Kivisto felt that it is wrong to call Finland a parliamentary democracy as long as Parliament and the president are users of supreme state power that are independent of one another.

Kivisto included a confession of faith in traditional foreign policy in his speech: "Our active, peace-seeking neutrality policy and relations of trust with our neighbor countries, the Soviet Union and the Nordic countries, are the basis for our policy."

Cautious Mending of Image

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 15 Jun 87 p 16

[Article by Kyosti Karvonen: "SKP Interim Congress Improves Party Image, Kemppainen Promoted to Leadership Troika, Kakela Opens Door a Crack to Stalinists"]

[Text] At the close of its 21st congress the SKP cautiously improved the images of its party leaders. The party completed the slight change in party image by approving a new program as a verbal arsenal.

An interim congress feeling was nevertheless in the air at Culture House. The over 200 congress delegates had not recovered from the hangover produced by the purging of the Stalinists. The impression hovered in the air that the party split might be behind them by the next congress.

We will get our first clue as to the chances of the moderates and Stalinists' narrowing the gap between themselves when it becomes clear how many Stalinists have the courage to enter the January presidential elections as electoral candidates for Kalevi Kivisto. The question will be answered next week.

Stalinists Divided

The conflict among the different moderate factions that surfaces during the party leader elections to be held at the next congress may grow because of attempts to rally the masses. There was a feeling of conflict that had arisen among the Stalinists at the Stalinist congress held a week ago.

This new Stalinist trend has become especially apparent in the form of rebellion against first secretary Jouko Kajanoja's presidential candidacy.

They are saying that the four-man DEVA [Democratic Alternative] parliamentary delegation is on the verge of a split because of the conflict over the presidency. There are similar conflicts within the Stalinist mouthpiece, TIEDONANTAJA.

Congress sources that long for the unification of the ranks hastened to assure us on Sunday that "hardliner" Member of Parliament Arvo Kempainen's promotion to vice chairman in the leadership troika does not necessarily mean that he will be promoted to succeed just reelected chairman Arvo Aalto.

The unification initiative, which has not yet even really been launched, also largely depends on the Stalinists and presupposes substantial changes in their leadership. The implicit assumption of those moderates thinking of unifying the ranks is that the Stalinists will not again create a shadow organization.

SKDL first secretary Reijo Kakela was the one who most clearly extended his hand in friendship to the Stalinists in his Saturday evening speech.

"Not All of Them Are in the SKP"

Kakela is one of the most important onlookers in Kivisto's election campaign. Many other signs too indicate that the center of gravity of political action in the extreme Left has shifted from the SKP to the SKDL.

"We have to admit that not all Finnish Communists are in our party.... It depends on our ability to see the yet fragile opportunities opened to us by the historical situation. Let's not lose them. Through our decisions we have shown on what basis the party can survive. We stick to this," was Kakela's message to the Stalinists.

"There are those who would go backwards into history. They may do so as far as I'm concerned. We send them greetings expressing our human sympathy as provisions for their trip into the past," Kakela said. He received the loudest of applause four times during his speech.

Aalto broached the issue of the Stalinists cautiously in his closing speech. He felt that not bringing up all sources of party tension was not a good thing. "We Finns are in the habit of holding our tongues on things that bother us and then suffering from stress."

Tallgren Is Back

The party's most acute top elections went as expected. The new Central Committee extended the terms of Aalto, vice chairwoman Helja Tammissola and first secretary Esko Vainionpaa. They grumbled most about the election of "office chief" Vainionpaa in the corridors of the congress hall.

The Helsinki District championed Heikki Valitalo, who was supposed to run against Vainionpaa, for the Central Committee. The plan failed since Valitalo did not get onto the Central Committee.

One of the most interesting names on the new Central Committee is Sirola Institute instructor Tutta Tallgren, one of the closest supporters of Jouko Kajanoja, who dropped out of the leadership at the last congress.

Tallgren was also enticed into the Politburo for tactical reasons as well aside from serving as bait for the Stalinists, since the Helsinki District had still

backed Pekka Peltola for the Politburo at the Central Committee organization meeting.

With the help of Tallgren, Peltola's path was cut off and they got Tatjaana Huhtala of Tampere into the Politburo. The other new member of the Politburo is Tanja Lehmuskoski of Helsinki.

Former Member of Parliament Mikko Ekorre's political star went into a steeper decline than before since he was dropped from the Central Committee. The intelligentsia wing's Lars D. Eriksson wanted out and Jan-Otto Andersson was promoted to the post in his stead. Veikko Lehtonen, the second chairman of the Metalworkers Union, also withdrew from the Central Committee. One of the new faces is the new leader of the Construction Workers Union, Pekka Hynonen.

Platform Is Not a Key

The new party platform has rid itself of its ballast of dogma and lost its faith in--in the words of Platform Committee chairman Arvo Kempainen--wonder-working socialism.

"In the work of developing socialism we have run into difficulties which, according to the theory we have presented in a simplified form, should not even have existed. This platform is not yet a philosophers' stone, a key to the solution of all our problems. We do not imagine ourselves to be such good alchemists, at least not in this Platform Committee," Kempainen confessed.

Chief editor Yrjo Rautio had slipped some colorful wording into the version of the platform that he composed. "The efforts of thousands of workers change owners like cards change hands in a poker game. Hot Florida gets cold businessmen from Finland," Rautio rhymed.

The glow did not permeate the committee, which changed its form: "Workers get to read in the morning paper in whose possession their jobs now are or whether they will soon have jobs at all."

In addition to the traditional "Internationale," the congress delegates sang the national anthem for the first time in congress history. Furthermore, it would not have been sung if Vantanen had not delivered a speech, to which he gave the title "Constructive Provocation" on the agenda, in which he revealed a desire to get the congress delegates to sing the national anthem.

DEVA Meeting Reflects Split

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Jun 87 p 10

[Article by Katri Peltola: "DEVA Champions Kajanoja As Presidential Candidate; Some of Them Want to Postpone Decision for Two Weeks"]

[Text] Stalinist Party first secretary Jouko Kajanoja was championed as the party's presidential candidate at a long-drawn-out meeting of the DEVA, the Stalinist Communist election party, on Saturday.

It was reported that the meeting, which began at 1000 hours, came to an end at 1900 hours, since the press conference had been postponed for 2 hours.

Neither DEVA chairwoman Kristiina Halkola nor Esko-Juhani Tennila were present at the press conference.

A fifth of the participants, primarily cultural activities people and including Tennila as well, would have preferred to postpone the nomination of the candidate for 2 weeks. During that time they would have discussed with Gov Kalevi Kivisto and the delegation of citizens that supports him whether cooperation with the independent DEVA is possible.

Motion Overturned in Straw Vote

The motion was not, however, carried in a straw vote and, according to DEVA first secretary Seppo Timonen, the decision at the meeting was unanimous.

In spite of everything, DEVA members intend to propose to the Kivisto citizens delegation that they cooperate with one another. In the DEVA members' opinion, the SKDL and the DEVA could, for example, enter into an election coalition in which each party would have its own presidential candidate.

Kajanoja and Timonen quite properly retracted statements made by party leader Taisto Sinisalo last week to the effect that Kivisto is unreliable, or unsuitable in terms of foreign policy.

Halkola, who opened the meeting, announced that the purpose of it was to consider how they might put together as broad a coalition as possible to oppose the Right.

"Everyone has the right to his own views; we don't indulge in a dictatorial policy," Halkola said. She left the meeting as early as midday.

According to Timonen, those attending the meeting unanimously agreed that the DEVA should enter the elections as an independent party. Since the SKDL has refused to enter a coalition with them, the DEVA cannot ask Kivisto to be its candidate.

No One Else But Kajanoja

The DEVA Advisory Committee did not suggest any other candidates than Kajanoja at its meeting. Ensio Laine and Tennila were, among others, mentioned last weekend at the Stalinist Communist congress.

The Stalinist cultural workers expressed their desire to back Kivisto, while the Red Youth Council proposed Marjatta Stenius-Kaukonen and Marja-Liisa Loyttyjarvi. It has been reported to the press that all of them have declined to run.

According to Member of Parliament Loyttyjarvi, they have not yet asked for electors for Kajanoja. "I will naturally serve as an elector if I am asked to do so. Tennila has also announced that the decisions will be carried out after they are made," Loyttyjarvi said.

Tennila said later: "The decisions have been made. No comment."

The DEVA Advisory Committee has 143 members, over 100 of whom were present.

Kivisto Candidacy Begins

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Jun 87 p 11

[Article: "Kivisto Severs Connections with Koivisto, Political Affiliations Out of Election Campaign, Door Open to DEVA Supporters Too"]

[Text] Having consented to be the presidential candidate of various citizens groups, Keski-Suomi Province Gov Kalevi Kivisto will sever his connections with the SDP [Social Democratic Party] candidate, President Mauno Koivisto, before the presidential elections to be held in January.

On Thursday Kivisto thought that the Swedish People's Party (RKP) and the Finnish Rural Party (SMP) would provide decisive support for Koivisto's reelection. Some RKP members are being listed on Koivisto's elector tickets. A proposal from the SMP concerning the presidential elections is expected at the end of the month.

Kivisto thought that the Conservative Party, the SDP's biggest government coalition partner, was considering a situation in which the small parties in the Conservative-Left government would determine the election of Koivisto. The Conservative Party is going into the elections with its own candidate, Prime Minister Harri Holkeri.

In 1982, plenty of time in advance, Kivisto suggested that his electors vote for Koivisto as early as in the opening round of votes. And that is what happened, with the exception of the Stalinists, who voted for Kivisto.

Situation Is Different

Kivisto gave as the reason for distancing himself from Koivisto the fact that the situation in the government and the election system were different during the last presidential elections than they are now.

In 1981 the SKDL was still part of a national coalition government and the old election system that was in effect did not exclude dark horses which, according to Koivisto, introduced factors of uncertainty into the election. "Now the situation is different in both respects," Kivisto acknowledged.

Kivisto did not, however, want to exclude the possibility either that his electors would back Koivisto. The electors carry out the election if not a single candidate obtains a majority behind him on the first ballot.

Kivisto did not want to commit himself in advance either because this time he is neither the SKDL candidate nor its chairman. Kivisto stressed the fact that his electors will reach an independent decision on his behavior, a decision in the making of which the presidential candidate will participate as one of them.

SKDL in the Background

On Thursday, after a postponement of several weeks, the SKDL party council reached its decision on the presidential issue. The SKDL took more time mainly to assemble a citizens delegation representing the science and culture sectors, which asked Kivisto to be a candidate on Tuesday.

First, the SKDL discovered that the constitution package, as yet not approved by the president and which allows voters associations that have collected 20,000 names to nominate their own candidates, could be exploited. It is said that SKDL first secretary Reijo Kakela and municipal secretary Matti Hokkanen were the ones who came up with the idea for the model of removing party affiliations from Kivisto's campaign.

In the event that the collecting of names should not be successful, the SKDL also left a back door open that would give it a chance to nominate Kivisto as its own candidate at the last moment.

The deadline for nominating candidates is 15 October. In addition, every elector candidate must be backed by a 100-name list.

The party council left it up to Kivisto and those assembling to back him to settle between them whether the SKDL or the voters association should nominate him as a candidate. In any event, the SKDL will take care of the technical details.

Yes to DEVA Members, No to DEVA

The party council has reached "a decision involving the SKDL in its own interest on Gov Kalevi Kivisto's candidacy in the presidential elections." Kivisto, however, emphasized that the organizations will not "actually" participate in the campaign.

On these grounds the SKDL rejected the election coalition the DEVA election party had been wooing it to join. The party council's DEVA members presented a motion on the matter, but it was not voted on.

Kivisto, however, felt that it was only right for all those who want to be elector candidates, DEVA members too, to be on the same starting line.

DEVA Member of Parliament Esko-Juhani Tennila, for example, is thinking of running as an elector for Kivisto. He also disputes Stalinist Party chairman Taisto Sinisalo's appraisal to the effect that Kivisto would not make a good candidate as a foreign policy leader.

Tennila, who was removed from the SKDL ticket just before the 1983 elections, amassed over 12,000 votes in the last parliamentary elections alone, which will make it difficult to beat him.

Kivisto Decides

According to the new law, the consent of the presidential candidate is required to nominate elector candidates. Kivisto was of the opinion that the presidential candidate resolves any problems in the final analysis.

The SKOL is counting on DEVA members' flocking en masse to back Kivisto. In accepting DEVA members, the SKOL will at the same time further tear apart Stalinist ranks that are already seriously divided on the presidential issue.

The DEVA Advisory Committee will decide on its presidential candidate on Saturday. The Stalinist Communist Party Politburo unanimously supported party first secretary Jouko Kajanoja's candidacy on Thursday.

Kivisto's campaign will be launched in November when he is on leave of absence from his gubernatorial post. On Saturday he will be speaking at the evening celebration of the 21st SKP Congress.

11,466

CSO: 3617/114

MODERATE CP NEWSPAPER REPORTS ON PARTY CONGRESS

New Central Committee Members

Helsinki KANSAN UUTiset in Finnish 13 Jun 87 p 19

[Article: "SKP Leadership May Be Substantially Replaced; Good Number of Women Are Candidates for Central Committee"]

[Text] The SKP [Finnish Communist Party] leadership, particularly the composition of the Central Committee, will be substantially replaced at the 21st party congress, which has now begun. The proposals just submitted to the Election Committee by the districts yesterday were indicative of this development.

It can just as clearly be seen from the district proposals that there is strong support for granting chairman Arvo Aalto, vice chairwoman Helja Tammissola and first secretary Esko Vainionpää a mandate to continue in office.

However, plenty of candidates have cropped up in the districts for the second vice chairman's post that became vacant when Aarno Aitamurto declined to stay on.

To our knowledge, the Election Committee was confronted with a downright "abundance dilemma" when it met at 2100 hours on Friday evening headed by its chairman, Jarmo Wahlstrom, for its first session to review the overall situation and the groundwork.

The committee will apparently have to discuss a "thoroughgoing" preliminary outline on the basis of which they would be able to initiate proper further consideration of the composition of the future party leadership and the Central Committee.

From the district proposals, it was especially apparent that a large number of women have been nominated as candidates for the new Central Committee. Some Election Committee members indeed thought that women's role in the choice of a new Central Committee will grow substantially.

Judging from the proposals, the new Central Committee is shaping up to be a diverse one in terms of occupational fields. There is also a need for increasing the number of young members on the Central Committee.

There is strong support in the different districts for SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] parliamentary delegation chairman Jarno Wahlstrom as the new vice chairman of the SKP. Many also want him to succeed Arvo Aalto at some future time.

Especially in the northern districts, there is support for Politburo member and Member of Parliament Arvo Kempainen as vice chairman. Also candidates, among others, are Politburo member and SKDL vice chairman Timo Laaksonen of Pori, SKDL first secretary Reijo Kakela, Member of Parliament Pertti Lahtinen of Tampere, Sinikka Vanhala of Etela-Hame, Tapani Elgland of Vaasa, Lars D. Eriksson of Helsinki and Yrjo Rautio of Oulu.

There are 50 members on the SKP Central Committee and 15 alternate members. The average age of the present Central Committee's members was 44 when they were elected in 1984 at the 20th SKP Congress.

New Party Program Approved

Helsinki KANSAN UUTiset in Finnish 15 Jun 87 p 1

[Article: "21st Party Congress Approves New Platform: 'SKP Is Politically and Ideologically United'"]

[Text] The 21st SKP Congress, which ended on Sunday, was busy, constructive and enthusiastically emancipated in terms of atmosphere.

The congress may also be described as a "women's congress" since the women's contribution was so influential in the speeches made from the floor during the congress sessions.

As chairman Arvo Aalto stated on Sunday, not once was the basic policy line expressed in the position paper drafts questioned in the 145 speeches delivered during the 3-day congress.

"From this we may draw the conclusion that our party is ideologically and politically united," Aalto declared.

He was alluding to the earlier more numerous number of affiliated parties and liberation movements, the atmosphere of reform and the necessary self-criticism.

There was something new that is also opportune--people who view matters differently but share a common concern grouped themselves about Kalevi Kivisto.

The congress approved a new platform for the party on Sunday, the third in succession and which replaces the 1969 platform.

In the new platform they are aiming for a socialist Finland, the special features of which would be an autonomous planned economy and a democratic society. The platform is a Marxist one and the traditions of the worker movement and humanism have been taken into account in it.

Civil rights and liberties would be expanded in the kind of socialism the party is aiming for and the opposition would also have freedom of speech and the freedom to organize itself.

Workers and administrative personnel must be able to influence decisions in the workplace. This will not be possible until monopoly of ownership is excluded from businesses as a basis for the use of power.

The congress furthermore approved a political resolution, a declaration of "Finland's 70 Years of Independence"—the approval of which was accompanied by a rendering of the national anthem led by education secretary Veikko Vantanen "as an item on the agenda"—a declaration "of the great socialist October Revolution of 70 years ago," as well as the responses to the initiatives proposed to the congress.

Congress Offered 'New Openings'

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 16 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Toward New Openings in Lively and Emancipated Fashion"]

[Text] The SKP's 3-day, 21st party congress was an indisputable success for the party: lively, active and united. Speaking of the last-mentioned characteristic of the SKP, it may surprise many people after the long decades of squabbling.

The nation above all was concerned about the party congress. The "controlled structural change" announced by the government was sharply criticized. This is quite understandable since the widespread layoffs effected in the course of last spring have hit the basic proletarian cells that are so close to the party hard and the congress severely suffered from the protests of these cells and the development of resistance. The cold winds of the structural change have a far-reaching effect.

Instead of curling up into its shell, the congress energetically directed the party toward renewal and outward. The fair wind that prevailed and drove before it a spontaneous citizens' movement in token of Kalevi Kivisto's presidential candidacy naturally gave wings to the active spirit of the congress.

The congress confirmed the policy the party has pursued for 3 years in its relations with the parallel party that has moved outside the bounds of the party. The congress did not, however, just pass sentences; it extended a strong invitation to return to the fold to the thousands who have remained on the sidelines and now feel greatly disappointed in the TIEDONANTAJA bunch and the DEVA's [Democratic Alternative] bouncing back and forth with regard to the presidential candidate issue, among others.

The SKP congress was intensely internationalist and the broad, active participation of representatives of the affiliated parties marked its proceedings. It is quite clear that international solidarity issues will in future occupy a much more important position than they have up to now in the work of the SKP organizations.

Since the claim that the party is obsolescent has been repeated almost like a recurrent phrase, this congress spoke of something else.

The women delegates were especially active and such an essential change has taken place with respect to this in the party's governing bodies that the SKP's image will certainly be noticeably different from what it has been up to now.

Paper Assesses Congress

Helsinki KANSAN UTISET in Finnish 16 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Big Chance"]

[Text] The complete success of the SKP congress appears to be a big surprise to many, in fact to the party leaders themselves as well. Since they had just gone through a difficult process of dissolution, they did not really believe in the party's chances of achieving anything constructive.

We must, of course, say that the country's biggest news media did not convey to the nation the feeling of liveliness and optimism that prevailed at the congress and which only became more pronounced toward the end. The affiliated party delegates who were observing the congress, for example, competed with one another in their appraisals of the importance of the congress and of its complete success.

The fact that, according to everyone who witnessed it, an insipid atmosphere and a lack of political discussion prevailed at the Conservative Party congress, which we might have expected to have turned into a great victory celebration, is paradoxical. Setting oneself objectives for achieving power is not really political discussion.

The SKP's success with its congress may mean that the motivation of those who have severed their connections with the party to return to the mother party is getting stronger. It will certainly activate those who have turned aside from it even more so.

The party's success will, however, depend on many factors, above all how the new, younger leadership, which includes more women, succeeds in performing its complicated tasks. Dealing with the class struggle from day to day is not the same as a celebration, which is what many participants in the SKP congress seem to have felt the party congress was.

Under no circumstances was there any question of an interim congress. The SKP has its big chance now.

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CSO: 3617/124

STALINIST PAPER ON PRESIDENTIAL RACE, AALTO PARTY CONGRESS

Kajanoja Assesses SKP(Y) Congress

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 17 Jun 87 p 5

[Article by Hannu Oittinen: "First Secretary Kajanoja Would Develop Method of Operating: Food Congress Obliges Us To Have Even Better One"]

[Text] Tampere (TA)—In a speech he made at a meeting of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] Tampere district committee on Monday, SKP(Y) first secretary Jouko Kajanoja reminded his listeners of the nature of the party development process. "While organizational issues were foremost at the Hervanta congress, at Dipoli we spoke of how we would succeed in our social mission, and at the next party congress we will speak about these tasks in concrete terms," Kajanoja sketched the course developments would take, to be sure designating his estimate to be a very rough one.

Kajanoja picked out certain key features of the present situation that have already been energetically raised in party discussion as well as in the discussion engaged in at the party congress.

"The appraisal of the present state of Finnish society raised the concept of neoconservatism, which was also strongly criticized. But there are some things in the new capitalist, conservative policy that we must be capable of analyzing so that we can apply countermeasures in the right way.

"Also the relationship between peace and the class struggle as well as the relationship between reforms, democratic change and socialism are timely in stimulating thought.

"Our members drafted a political position paper for a new belief in environmental issues. Thanks to the party congress, new points of view were also assumed on organizational considerations and our relations with the trade union movement," first secretary Kajanoja said.

Kajanoja reminded his listeners that party discussion would continue now as a discussion of the program and that the plan of action would be approved at the August Central Committee meeting on the basis of the position paper.

Prophets Abroad

In a situation involving organizational problems and a conservative landslide, achievements often go unnoticed. A newspaper article that distorts the truth produces its own addition.

"The affiliated parties' appraisals of our congress were surprisingly favorable. The world has been given a picture of us as a shrinking, politically insignificant force that has concentrated only on criticism of chairman Aalto. None of these is true according to foreign appraisals.

"The very outcome of the DEVA [Democratic Alternative] election was a surprise beyond our expectations and this congress confirmed the impression of our national importance. It is well that we ourselves take note of this," Jouko Kajanoja said.

Kajanoja felt that primarily two kinds of expressions of dissatisfaction at the congress were manifestations of impatience that assumed externally contradictory forms of expression.

"Over 20 delegates demanded a new party and some people who took the floor demanded unity without explaining how it was to be achieved. Neither of them can be called organized factions. They reflect weariness with the present situation without visualizing actual ways of building unity, which is a complicated process. So, since there were 308 delegates at the congress, it was very harmonious in terms of the views expressed," Kajanoja noted.

Kajanoja said that he frequently had to answer the question posed by representatives of the affiliated parties as to whether we really considered Aalto's party to be a communist party.

"Of course we do, but at the same time we see noncommunist elements in it. What else are, for example, among other things the demands that the SKP and the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] unite to form a general socialist party?" Kajanoja gave us the gist of his reply.

Of Presidents and Elections

Chosen to be the DEVA presidential candidate, Kajanoja reminded his listeners of his last-minute efforts [for a coalition with] the SKDL and Kivisto. When from those quarters it was affirmed that "nothing will be entered into with the DEVA" and that "the SKDL will handle Kivisto's election campaign," according to Kajanoja, they had to nominate their own candidate so that they could secure their independent emergence [in the election]. They will also continue with their efforts to cooperate with Kivisto's citizens' council, as the DEVA committee had decided they would.

"The discussion of the matter brought with it problems for new elements in the process our party is going through. The members of one behind-the-scenes DEVA community, the SKP(Y), did not get a chance to say enough about the matter in the time allotted them. The subsequent events forced the new Central Committee to immediately devise a new method of proceeding.

"We have to start to take action now; we will link our peace effort firmly with foreign policy. The challenges of integration with the West are transforming people's most important daily affairs into a part of foreign policy such that the struggle over our domestic and economic policies is assuming entirely new dimensions. In our election campaign the president's powers are to be viewed as a question of the extension of democracy," first secretary Jouko Kajanoja said in conclusion.

At the congress the Tampere district committee assumed a position in which they supported the DEVA decision to enter the elections as an independent party and to nominate Jouko Kajanoja as its candidate. The district committee also supported a motion to cooperate with Kalevi Kivisto's citizens' council. In the opinion of the district committee, they need to begin to nominate a candidate, get an election organization into operation and secure a financial foundation for the elections right now.

Aalto Party's Program Examined

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 18 Jun 87 p 11

[Commentary by Vesa Oittinen: "SKP Gets New Program in Culture House]

[Text] "Man has entered an age of dizzying potential. The keys to prosperity, progress and freedom are in his hands, but also the key to total destruction.... Our globe has become a village in which every event affects and touches all of us."

This is how the Aalto-led SKP's new program, which was approved at the party's 21st congress held in Culture House last week, begins. KANSAN TAHTO chief editor Yrjö Rautio is responsible for having put the finishing touches to the form of the final version, but in terms of content it differs very little from the draft sent at the time for discussion by the organization.

Aalto's SKP has now gotten a new platform in which the emphases are quite a bit different from those of the platform approved in 1969 which has been in effect up to now.

"One important object of consideration has been how we are going to define the party's ideological base," Arvo Kemppainen, who chaired the platform committee at the congress, stated to KANSAN UUTiset on 15 June.

"We have deliberately omitted Marxist-Leninism from the definition because we know that that interpretation has a specific kind of limited meaning for our conceptions of theory and policy."

In the new platform "those ideas, the foundation for which was laid by Marx, Engels and Lenin and the tradition of social struggle they inspired," are defined as the SKP's ideological base.

The wording gives interpreters plenty of elbow room, which Kemppainen further expanded in his interview:

"We don't want to be limited to just those persons. We know that a considerable number of people contemporaneous with and after them have further influenced the shaping and development of the theory. We too want to participate in this work."

The opportunistic practical policy that has lasted for years has also now been written down on paper in the form of a relativization of the SKP's ideological premises.

Even at the time the platform draft was published, many people—at TIEDONANTAJA too—took note of the fact that the drafters of the Aalto party platform did not define Finland as a capitalist, state monopoly country. Mention of the concept of monopolies is also avoided in the final version of the platform.

Kemppainen made it clear in KANSAN UUTISET that this was done deliberately:

"Instead of the former idea, forming a front against the so-called monopolies, we speak of an "alliance of forces for change." We would like to have in it all those organizations and people that want to change the present capitalist system and our present way of life."

Now that the notion of monopolies has been cut out of the platform, the fact that political and social opponents can no longer be accurately defined is a problem. Instead of the struggle against the monopolies, the platform sets as SKP goals the conquest of "alienation," crushing the "despotism of property" and self-government.

The class nature of the state no longer clearly appears in the platform. From the point of view expressed in the platform, Finland is more a sort of dual power country. On the one hand, we have a highly developed "democracy" while, on the other, an oligarchy still dominates the economic sector.

The essential deviation from the basic judgments of the international communist movement is contained in the above-cited opening words of the platform.

Of course, it holds true that, today's news media being what they are, our globe can be viewed as a village in which every event affects all of us. However, the fact that we are living at a time during which we are shifting from capitalism to socialism is more decisive from the standpoint of the fate of mankind. This is not brought out in the platform.

Because of the lack of an appraisal of the times, it probably follows that the Aalto SKP platform does not regard practical socialism's role in world history as being the most important bearer of progress. On the contrary, it gives a surprisingly negative picture of the existing socialism. Its shortcomings are emphasized, although it finally admits that "socialism /offers us a chance/ [in italics] (printed in italics) to free people from [illegible word] of one person to another."

To be sure, the prospect of a socialist Finland is in reserve. The only problem is that the way to it, the means, the objectives and the opponent are lacking or buried in the folds of vague turns of phrase.

Democratic Alternative Election Program

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 23 Jun 87 p 6

[Election platform: "DEVA Election Platform Discussion Begins: Finland Needs New Way of Thinking"]

[Text] On Saturday, 13 June, the Democratic Alternative (DEVA) Advisory Committee approved a political resolution on the presidential elections. It serves as an opener to discussion by citizens and the press of the DEVA election platform. So their purpose is to draft the presidential election platform through civic discussion just as they did the parliamentary election platform. Discussion of the platform will be scheduled chiefly in August and September. The election platform will be approved at the DEVA advisory Committee meeting to be held in early October.

The political resolution is as follows:

The peoples of different countries and parts of the world are more widely active than ever: for the survival of mankind, against U.S. leaders' arms policy and nuclear war, to prevent an environmental catastrophe and to stop the industrialized countries' imperialist exploitation.

Human beings have the right to peace and to life, the right to security and equality. Their realization presupposes broad international collaboration. Today there is a great deal of talk about internationalism and internationalization. By this we mean cooperation on an equal basis that respects every nation's independence and right to self-determination. We are against the kind of "internationalism" that is based on the subjugation of peoples, threats or the use of force.

What direction is the internationalization of Finland moving in?

Our country is being drawn to the West at an ever increasing rate, to the Council of Europe, to European economic cooperation. The big companies and commercial banks are determining the direction we are moving in. The growth of unemployment, the increase in social insecurity, the commercialization of culture, the pollution of our environment and the advance of the Right are indications of this course.

We want to put a stop to this development.

Finland needs a new way of thinking. We want to put together a broad front that works for peace and our country's independent, democratic development. We will have to choose a direction for Finland in the 1988 presidential elections: either the choice of a new way of thinking and an active peace effort—or passive adaptation, becoming imperialism's "neutral" driftwood and a narrowing of our independence.

1. We need a president who is for peace.

We need a president who dares to say no to Reagan and risks his own international status for a nuclear-free Northern Europe and a nuclear-free

world. A president who publicly opposes the Star Wars system, the United States' Central-American policy, nuclear tests and the arming of Northern Europe.

Finland needs a head of state--man or woman--who will sever diplomatic relations with the South African Government. Who clearly supports Nicaragua and Angola as well as other countries that have rid themselves of imperialism. Who supports the struggles of the anti-imperialist liberation movements of Southern Africa, Central America and other parts of the world with his own contribution.

Finland's president must through his own actions consolidate the status of the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact as the basis of our country's foreign policy. In Finnish-Soviet relations, for example, the president must work for the extension of detente as a worldwide practice and for peaceful cooperation. We cannot stand still as concerns the development of Finnish-Soviet relations.

We need a president who supports the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and other countries and who is not afraid of publicly announcing the idea of the necessity of a new international security arrangement.

The president of the Republic of Finland must demonstrate a sense of reality and must be courageous enough to say that Finland cannot strengthen its security through force of arms. As head of the Armed Forces, he must be willing to cut down on our ground forces and reduce the time compulsory military service recruits and civilian service personnel have to serve.

The people of Finland are entitled to a president who openly opposes reactionary efforts and those opposed to friendly relations between Finland and the soviet Union. He should have the firmness to oppose a resurgence of the notion of a voluntary militia.

As president of the Republic of Finland we need a man who serves in the peace and solidarity movement as well as being president. He listens to the voices of the peace movement and civic organizations and implements citizens' active desire for peace in his actions.

2. We need a president who will fight unemployment. The president must be courageous enough to say that the assets produced by Finnish workers belong to the Finnish people and are not to be taken out of the country. He must have the courage to state that the policy of "competitiveness" and of tying ourselves to the West advocated by bankers and the industrial sectors is the reason for mass layoffs and the closing down of factories in Finland. The president of the republic--man or woman--must constantly keep our country's independence and right to self-determination from being infringed upon and the decision-making power from being transferred to supranational agencies, international banks and supranational companies.

The president of Finland must say no to our country's joining the Council of Europe. He must work to see to it that Eureka and the other forms of cooperation that are closed to the socialist countries are opened to everyone

as common European forums of detente that strengthen peaceful cooperation on an equal basis.

Our president must exert his influence to see to it that Finnair cancels its aircraft purchase contract with the arms industrial giant, McDonald-Douglas, which is one of the Pentagon's biggest suppliers. He must also act to free VALMET's [state metal company] elevator and air-conditioning divisions from their ties with the United Technologies combine, which annually supplies the U.S. Army with billions of dollars worth of arms.

Finnish citizens have the right to a president who does not surrender to the "structural change" of the bankers and factory owners which is creating unemployment and insecurity. He will work for a course of development that creates new jobs in the cities as well as in rural areas, that supports development areas and that has respect for the labor of Finnish workers and farmers.

The extension of good relations between Finland and the Soviet Union will in all ways occupy a key position in the Finnish president's actions. Our president will actively promote cooperation in the field of production and joint ventures to create jobs, improve our country's production structure and cut down on our ties with the West. He will also promote cooperation in the fields of culture and art. The president will work to promote cooperation in the fields of science and research.

3. We need a president who defends citizens' rights. We need a president who does not try to concentrate power in himself, but one who respects and emphasizes the importance of Parliament in the handling of the nation's affairs and who is ready to support the limiting of the president's domestic policy powers.

We need a head of state--man or woman--who respects the wishes of citizens and civic organizations and listens readily to the voices of the peace and environmental protection movements, the women's movement, young people and pensioners. We need a president who relies on the worker movement in his activities and sets value on the activities of its members and organizations.

The president of Finland must work to see to it that citizens' opportunities to participate increase and are not reduced, which increases in strike penalties, laws governing the delegation of powers and plans for state-of-emergency laws represent.

4. We need a president who is elected on the basis of broad civic discussion and action.

In our opinion, we need discussion that goes to the roots of affairs concerning Finland's foreign policy and issues involving its fate. No single candidate possesses ultimate wisdom nor can he resolve issues alone.

In our opinion, it is time to put together a broad front for discussion and action that will unite the different leftist and progressive forces and the parties and election coalitions that are behind the different candidates. We

want to assemble a broad coalition composed of the progressive forces, in which each of them is equal, with its own principles and opinions.

We propose that we set about organizing these discussion and action forums for peace and the independent, democratic development of Finland everywhere--at the national as well as local levels and among young people, women, workers, intellectuals and pensioners as well as other groups of citizens and the different civic organizations.

Democratic Alternative, registered party
Advisory Committee meeting, 13 June 1987

11,466
CSO: 3617/123

NO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE SEEN IN SELF-CREATED 'HEAVY CLIMATE'

Athens ANDI in Greek 3 Jul 87 p 3

[Text] On Thursday, Mr Keeley "confers" with Papoulias on terrorism; on Friday the pro-government newspapers write about an attempt of "political sabotage" and "cutting off of the premier" on the part of the United States; on Saturday, I VRADYNI and the NEW YORK TIMES write about contacts by government officials with Abu Nidal and the ASALA of the Armenians; on Sunday we learn that the government regards the things that Keeley said to be "ridiculous, untenable, slanderous, and suspect"; on Sunday again, Mitsotakis charges that the threads of the investigation on terrorism "perhaps" lead to members of PASOK; on Monday, 29 June, Giorgos Rautopoulos, chairman of the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor] and a member of the PASOK Central Committee, falls victim to a fortunately unsuccessful assassination attack on the part of the "revolutionary" organization "First of May" that has appeared for the first time.

This had been preceded by the arrest of the Italian Folini on Monday, 22 June, which prepared the climate for the news reports of the entire week--even of Monday itself: "Terrorists Within PASOK" cried the rightist newspapers in the newspaper stands, at a time when G. Rautopoulos was hovering between life and death at the hospital.

Is there perhaps a causal relationship among the events which transpired from one Monday to the next? And if there is, what is it? And what outcome will there be? What kind of "messages" are being exchanged by unknown players, lost in the darkness, among themselves? Or are these perhaps merely a series of infernal coincidences that have finally managed to create a heavy and unhealthy political climate?

To be more precise, an already existing heavy climate has been aggravated: We had the crisis in the Aegean, the bomb on the American military bus, the "association of assassins," the dossier on Cyprus, the self-immolation of a farmer, bombs at ministries--even a hideous crime, precisely in the days of the talk about terrorism. At the same time inflation runs on, unemployment is increasing and so are the deficits, the economic balances are worsening, the insurance funds are giving out, and scandals and abuses are all the rage.

Such a piling up of individual or interdependent crises has not been known in this country since after the change in government. What do all these things add up to? Where are they leading? Is it simply the crisis of a party in distress, or is the crisis that of the entire society? Are the victories in basketball enough to absorb all these tensions that are running through our social tissue, the economic fabric, the political system, our foreign relations, and the national issues?

It is not ultimately of great significance whether the murderers of the "First of May" are moved by others, or by their own senseless and criminal personal revolutionary obsession. One way or another their existence points to another crisis. In the first case they are nothing but the pawns of a plan--with unknown objectives but also with an uncertain outcome. Many planners have been victims of their own plans. In the second and rather more likely case they are nothing but the representatives of a climate of despair, of uncertainty, of things at an impasse. Representatives who reach the point of treading on corpses in order to contrive to make the others listen to them, in order for their crude "anti-establishment" humming and hawing to acquire the weight and the significance of the bullet and blood.

Let us be honest: The agents and the secret services cannot destabilize anything except societies that are in an unstable equilibrium. Let the premier and his echoers, whether by order or as copy-cats, stop at last thumping alarm-bells and lawbooks and let them ask themselves what are the "dark forces" that are setting in motion all these disruptive social processes. And it is certain that they will not discover agents: They will find daily realities, well-known truths. They will find also persons: First and foremost themselves. And parties: Their own at the very top.

Foreign fingers can at most scratch the wounds and make them bleed. But who have caused the wounds?

12114

CSO: 3521/155

COMMENTS ON PAPANDREOU'S PERCEIVED LONG-TIME ANTI-AMERICANISM

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 3-9 Jul 87 pp 8-10

[Article by N. D. Delipetros]

[Excerpts] We talk in a whisper because we do not want even ourselves to hear what we are saying.

Thus, it is said very frequently--or perhaps you have not heard it?--that Mr Andreas is "America's man"!

Of course, this rumor not at all do honor to Mr Andreas. We would say that it is insulting and slanderous. Because a Greek premier is--ought to be--only the man of the Greeks. And when he is clearly a man of the Greeks, he can, from that point on, be a friend of the English, French, Portuguese, Germans, Russians, Americans, and of the entire world.

Thus Mr Andreas is not--we do not allow that he can be--"America's man."

In our opinion, Mr Andreas is neither America's man, nor a friend of the Americans. What is he?

Let us start from what is known, in order to proceed in this way by keeping to some thread, some clue, which could help us to explore the labyrinth of Andreas Papandreou.

As is known, Mr Andreas has never lost an opportunity to display his antipathy towards the West: His political background--especially following the post-dictatorship period--is full of contradictions, of inconsistencies, and of impressive about-faces. But his policy has one--and only one--fixed point: It is anti-Western.

When he happens to be induced--or compelled--to say some friendly word about the West, he immediately hastens to rectify the situation by expressing his unreserved sympathy towards the policy of the East.

He has given us the impression that he fears that he may be misunderstood and be considered pro-Western.

Of course, the theory is also very widespread--though expressed in whispers--that Mr Andreas is playing the part of the anti-Western, while in reality he is "America's man."

The damage that Mr Andreas has openly caused the Western countries is tremendous--either as a premier, when he was disrupting for such a long time the joint defensive policy of the West, or as a partner of NATO, when he took care to have reservations and to differ with its political decisions, or as an associate of the EEC, when he exploited the 6 months of the Greek chairmanship in carrying on a dispute against the defensive policy of the West.

But it seems that all these diplomatic importunities--others speak of "attacks"--against the West, which were simultaneously great services to the East, have not yet persuaded a fairly large number of Greeks that Mr Andreas is not a friend of the West, let alone "America's man."

All these things, you can hear them whispering to you, are "tricks," are "practical jokes" and "camouflage"!

But in any case we ourselves cannot accept the view that American policy is planned and executed by political masochists who are delighted when they are hurt, and that Mr Andreas benefits from this American "vice."

How can we forget that until the time when Mr Andreas made his political appearance in our country, anti-Americanism was constituted by a small sect whose faithful were limited to the confines of the Communist Party and its conscious or unconscious fellow-travellers?

Anti-Westernism amounted to 13 to 15 percent! And Mr Andreas came and proclaimed anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism as an ideology, which is now followed by large masses of people. Is it not so?

It is so, of course. But when an idea sticks in some stubborn Greek mind, it is very difficult to unstick it: "Andreas," they say to you, "is America's man"!

And why, pray tell, is he America's man?

Because it is so: He is America's man!

Quod erat demonstrandum!

And the most curious thing is that some of the propagandists of the idea that Andreas is supposedly "America's man" are even a number of PASOK followers, who aim thereby to throw dust in the eyes of the naive and decadent middle classes, who base the security and the existence of Greece not on an alliance with but on the protection of the Americans! And we ascribe to the term "protection" the meaning it had in the 19th century.

Listen to them whispering to us:

- Since Andreas is "America's man," we can sleep peacefully!

In fact, this view is one of the cozy pillows that certain decadent Greeks use to help them enjoy their very sound sleep.

- Andreas is America's man!

- Sure, sure, sure, sure!

We will confess that such views disappoint us, because they indicate that a part of our middle class has sunk into social and also national decay.

Because if Mr Andreas were indeed America's man, then the esteemed middle class gentlemen not only ought not to be sleeping, but on the contrary ought to be very deeply concerned about the nation. Because, firstly, American interests do not always coincide--especially at all points--with Greek interests. And, secondly, because merely the suspicion that the fortunes of Greece are controlled by a policy that in reality is foreign ought to make us take to the streets in protest--and not be blissfully asleep.

We are sorry, but we will point out that the apathetic acceptance as a discussable point of the view that Mr Andreas can be "America's man" shows that in our country we are now passing through a period of national and social decadence.

Thus, Mr Andreas is neither "America's man" nor its friend.

Would that he were a true friend of the Americans and of the West more generally. Because then he would be able--to the extent of his abilities, of course--to link to a large degree Greek with Western interests and to expect favorable treatment, by virtue of his pro-Western alignment.

But since, as we assert, he is neither the "man" nor a friend of the Americans, what is Mr Andreas?

We believe that it has been generally accepted that this column of articles is written with a sense of responsibility.

This sense of responsibility does not allow us to formulate an absolutely clear-cut opinion:

We know what he is not, but we do not know exactly what Mr Andreas is.

The attitude of the chairman of PASOK vis-a-vis the Americans, and more generally with respect to the West, raises many questions. But also questions are raised by the attitude of the Americans, or if you prefer by certain singular Americans, with respect to Mr Andreas.

Certainly Ambassador Keeley is one of those Americans who have raised a number of questions. He is an ambassador who, in order to strengthen the national prestige of Mr Andreas, had reached the point of denouncing all the administrations prior to PASOK as being client subjects of American policy--that is, as nationally dishonorable and servile administrations.

Can it be that it was the same Keeley who a few days ago found the courage to call on the Greek minister of foreign affairs and complain to him that the Greek government has suspect relations with the renowned Mr Abdul Nidal?

Was not Mr Keeley ashamed? Did he not send someone else to convey to Papoulias these very serious American charges?

The American embassy in Athens has--thank God!--different sorts of people.

Thus, we do not know what precisely Mr Andreas is. But we have been persuaded for some time now that his policy is harmful to our country. Because it ceaselessly confuses the interests of his party with the interests of the country. And because he howls only when something that has to do with the party pains him!

The view is also prevalent that the Americans sometimes control Mr Andreas.

The supporters of this view do not take the trouble to tell us "when they control him" and "how they control him." We would characterize this view as irresponsible, unacceptable, and hair-raising to us as a nation.

Moreover, does not the sharp way in which Mr Andreas has reacted to the recent protest of the Americans show that he does not fear them?

We believe that it does.

But we are obliged to recall also that in every Greek village there are certain fearless souls who, when they leave the cemetery, stamp their feet and cry out in order to find...courage.

12114

CSO: 3521/155

REPORTED PAPANDREOU DECISIONS ON REFERENDUM, USSR RELATIONS

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 8 Jul 87 p 7

[Text] Recent developments lead many observers to the view that A. Papandreou is much more interested in PASOK's political survival and its staying in power than he is in governing the country. This is because since the Greek-Turkish crisis public opinion polls show that the governing party has suffered significant losses both in numbers and in credibility.

In view of these negative--quantitatively and qualitatively--developments for his party and for himself, Papandreou, following repeated conferences 40 days ago with A. Livanis, G. Roumbatis, Kar. Papoulias, Khr. Makheritsas, and other cadres--we did not find out who they were--made certain decisions which are extremely interesting.

First of all, the premier considers it to be expedient to emphasize his good relations with the Soviet Union, because in this way he will prevent defections to the communist Left. Papandreou will try to create a continuing electoral atmosphere to keep things under his control in case he finds it necessary to suddenly call for early elections.

In this context, because the government's performance is totally negative, Papandreou, with K. Papoulias and G. Roumbatis concurring, will place great emphasis on nationalism, pro-Sovietism, and anti-Americanism. In this way, Papandreou helps the party cadres "to go the people" and provides them with some nationalistic arguments in the absence of substantive accomplishments.

Many Greeks and foreign diplomats do not rule out that Papandreou may go as far as to stage events that could provoke a nationalist hysteria, so that under such conditions he may call for an election. In many circles the prevailing view now is that PASOK will stoop to anything provided the situation created favors the coalescence around it of the so-called "forces of social change."

Many also doubt that Papandreou will hold a plebiscite on the question of the American bases in Greece. Therefore, to the degree he will try to avoid this trying experience, he must find an alternative solution, in the March 9, 1985 style, as journalist Giannis Lampsas said recently.

However, some other believe that Papandreou will prefer to stay on for the entire 4-year term, holding elections in the spring of 1989. Thus, he will take advantage of the Greek chairmanship in the EEC to show he is pro-European, but at the same time, with the end of the base agreement, play it "anti-American".

All these revisions and reassessments by the premier are due to the fact that he has come to realize he made a mistake speaking in the Chamber of Deputies on his intention to hold a plebiscite on the future of the American bases in Greece. According to a public opinion poll, 70 percent of ND followers will vote in favor of letting the bases stay, but only 16 percent of PASOK followers will do so. This means that Papandreou will not win in the plebiscite. Now his big problem is how to avoid it.

7520

CSO: 3521/159

GORBACHEV LETTER SEEN 'GOOD-WILL GESTURE'

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 8 Jul 87 p 5

[Text] Why did A. Papandreou keep secret for almost 50 days the full text of a letter he received from Mikhail Gorbachev, the Secretary General of the CPSU? Why was his answer to Gorbachev made public only in part? Replies to these questions are found in the strategy of theatrical policies played for years by Papandreou with the single objective of reaching certain acknowledged or unmentionable goals.

In this context, Papandreou--with the forthcoming negotiations on the bases and the possibility that they may lead to early elections--desperately needed the support--at least on the verbal level--of the communist world which at a substantial level has very close and productive relations with Turkey!

Thus, in the face of the Soviet Union's inability to buy Greek tobacco, to offer economic support to Greece and to provide Greek diplomacy with real assistance--Papandreou, with the aid of trusted friends who also have friendly relations with the Soviets, tried to extract a spectacular letter from Gorbachev in exchange for not visiting Greece. For this effort, Papandreou mobilized Akis Tsokhatzopoulos, G. Roumbatis, Kap. Papoulas, one journalist, and our ambassador in Moscow who persuaded the Soviets on his "extreme usefulness."

Since the Soviets know and acknowledge that Greece is in line with their foreign policies and serves its goals within the Western Alliance, remaining a passive member in it, they had no choice but to give in to the Greek entreaties.

This, especially in a period when Soviet foreign policy has many aspects of an "operation charm," while at the same time oriented toward close and productive relations with the West European socialist parties and especially the German SPD, the British Labour Party, PASOK, and possibly Bettino Craxi's party in Italy.

Therefore, Gorbachev decided to extend a helping hand to his "like-minded friend," Andreas Papandreou in order to secure for him the communist support at little cost to Soviet-American relations.

But while Papandreou kept in the drawer the "trump" Gorbachev letter, the sudden action of the State Department upset initial plans regarding timing for the use of the Gorbachev letter and forced its early disclosure.

It is assumed that the key role in this move by Papandreou was played by Giannis Roumbatis, an old(?) collaborator in the weekly PONDIKI, which he had every reason to supply with a spectacular scoop. VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS suggested that it is possible the leak came from the Soviet Embassy. Journalist A. Stangos, a close collaborator of PONDIKI, has close relations with the Soviet embassy.

The question now is what will the effect be on our country's foreign relations following publication of the Gorbachev-Papandreou letters. According to diplomatic sources, Greece's openings to Soviet allies will make the West come to the conclusion that Greece is a negative element in the Alliance, with all the consequences that follow.

At the same time it will serve as positive proof that the Soviet Union, the leader of the socialist camp, wants Papandreou to stay in power. That means they should not repeat "stupid actions" as they did in the municipal elections [when they refrained from supporting PASOK candidates for mayor in Athens, Pireaus and Salonica].

On the other hand, no one can foretell what Washington will do now that Papandreou has shown all his cards. It is equally difficult to predict what new "crisis" he will manufacture to get out of the impasse he himself caused by his anti-Americanism and prejudices.

7520

CSO: 3521/159

ALLEGED RESPONSIBILITY FOR GORBACHEV-PAPANDREOU CORRESPONDENCE LEAK

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 6 Jul 87 p 4

[Article by Kostas G. Skouras: "Whom By Any Chance Did the Leak Benefit?"]

[Excerpt] The leak to an Athenian newspaper--a satirical one at that--of the Gorbachev-Papandreu correspondence, which focused on the American bases in Greece, added a new dimension to the game played the past 2 weeks concerning a major issue of our foreign policy. This issue, directly connected to the balance of power in the area and to the importance of Greece in the overall Western defense, determines (to a very large degree) the course of Greek-American relations.

Almost no one doubts that this time the leak was intentional. The text of the letters, that is, was deliberately given for publication at this time. Why this particular newspaper [PONDIKI] was selected is also open to discussion which can raise justifications and arguments. But the point which cannot be easily supported with rational arguments is: whom and what specific objectives did the leak serve?

In other words, whom did the publication of the letters benefit at the very moment when on the one hand the Greek and American governments are formally involved in a deadlock which could be unrelated to the fate of the bases, but which the Greek side deliberately linked with the letters at a time, moreover, when both sides appear "hard" and "unyielding".

The Greek side demanded a public revocation of the contents to the two diplomatic representations (to Washington and Athens), while the American side categorically rejected such action, invoking the fact that it did not make any public statements and, therefore, it had nothing to recall publicly. What it told the Greek government was within the scope of routine contacts between allied and friendly governments on issues concerning them.

But while the Greek-American "entanglement" continued and Washington had indeed taken the first "low-key" steps to relieve the tension (with statements by State Department spokesman Charles Redman and Rozanne Ridgeway)--steps which Athens considered positive but insufficient--the "secret letters" were leaked (the first dated 14 May from Gorbachev to Papandreu and the second dated 9 June from Papandreu to Gorbachev).

The leak did not help improve the climate in Athens-Washington relations. On the contrary, it added a new, darker cloud in the overall relations between them.

Many observers consider the leak as the work of PASOK partisans who persuaded Papandreou to allow it with two objectives in mind: to satisfy PASOK's leftist followers that the government maintains high-level contacts with the Eastern Bloc whose recommendations and conditions it takes under consideration and, to send a message to the American side that the East also accepts the Greek government's "hardening", a fact Washington should not forget, especially for what is about to follow in the future.

Other political observers believe the government's leak was an answer to the American side's leaking of information to THE NEW YORK TIMES and to a TV channel about Abu Nidal's presence in Athens and his contacts with officials of the Greek government.

But regardless of any version or interpretation, Western observers in Athens found it difficult to accept a plausible justification for the leaking of the letters. They could not understand what the Papandreou government hoped to gain by appearing to the whole Western world as accepting from Moscow recommendations and instructions in the implementation of its foreign policy, especially when, at the same time, its problem of disagreement with the United States concerned terrorism. These same circles consider the encouragement of an anti-Greek climate in the West by the Greek government itself as nonsensical and irrational.

However, those who closely follow the government's ways of reacting at times of tension or crisis, do not forget how the Papandreou government reacted to Cypriot President Kyprianou or against the Turkish Coast Guard ship outside Limnos with instructions to shoot, or recently against Turkey again (the reasons which led to this tension [Aegean] have not yet been given).

Papandreou himself has not answered the specific charges in the Chamber of Deputies by ND leader Mitsotakis that the whole tension subsided only when I. Kapsis assured Ambassador Akiman that the Greek government would not undertake any exploration or drilling outside the six-mile limit.

Certain people hastened to link the leak of the letters with the government's desire to maintain a tense situation in view of the possibility of holding early elections in the fall of 1987...This argument lacks the point which is decisive: the Greek government is not in a position to determine not only the course of the burning domestic problems which occupy Greek public opinion today and, much more still, it cannot influence the development of the serious external problems which, in view of an electoral confrontation, will undoubtedly play a leading role.

A government with a small parliamentary majority, with an undoubtedly shrinking popular support, and with its own prestige in the country and abroad at its nadir cannot afford to be led to an electoral confrontation, especially when it has open fronts on so sensitive and momentous issues, the development of which it cannot define because of its other more general weaknesses.

POLL RESULTS ON POPULAR PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM, U.S. BASES

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 22 Jul 87 pp 11-12

[Text] The last issue of the EPIKAIRA magazine published the answers given to timely questions on terrorism and Greek-American relations. The principal characteristic of the public's reactions is the large number of persons queried who refuse to answer or do not know.

The following questions were asked in the Athens area by the ICAP-GALLUP organization:

Table 1

Why do you think that no terrorist has been arrested yet?

--The police is to blame	26 percent
--Government elements are putting obstacles in the way of the police	30 percent
--The police do not cooperate with services in other countries	10 percent
--Other reasons	7 percent
--I do not know--No answer	37 percent

Table 2

In your opinion, what was the motive behind the assassination attempt by the terrorists against Ravtopoulos?

--A reaction against the policy of austerity	29 percent
--A foreign intervention for destabilization by the CIA	19 percent
--A foreign intervention for destabilization by the East	6 percent
--A foreign intervention for destabilization by the Turks	3 percent

--Other reasons	6 percent
--I do not know--No answer	37 percent

Table 3

From what you have heard or read in relation to the recent denunciation by the Americans of the government's reported contacts with Arab terrorists, do you believe that:

--It was used as pressure for the negotiations on the bases	47 percent
--Perhaps the Americans are right in their accusation	7 percent
--Thus far the government's behavior has provided cause for such denunciations	11 percent
--Other reasons	3 percent
--I do not know--No answer	33 percent

Table 4

In his letter to Mr Papandreou, Secretary General Gorbachev claimed that there is "a unanimous demand by the Greek people for the removal of the U.S. bases from the country."

1. Do you believe that this constitutes an intervention in our domestic affairs?

Yes	31 percent
No	46 percent
I do not know--No answer	23 percent

2. Do you indeed believe that the Greek people are unanimously against the bases?

Yes	45 percent
No	34 percent
I do not know--No answer	20 percent

What is noteworthy in these tables is the high degree of responsibility attributed to the government in matters of internal terrorism, which is in contrast to the results on matters of foreign terrorism (contacts with Arabs). It is also significant to note that the theory of the CIA bearing the moral responsibility for the assassination attempt against Ravtopoulos--which the pro-government press unsuccessfully attempted to cultivate--gains a low

percentage. It is clear, then, that the government failed to impress public opinion on its "heroic" clash with the United States.

However, Table 4 clearly shows that there is a strong front against the bases, a fact that is creating some danger for Mr Papandreu, should he carry out his promise of a referendum. In studying these results, we should always bear in mind that the area of the capital is approximately 4 percent more to the left than the rest of the country.

/6091

CSO: 3521/163

EFFECT OF LIKELY PSD VICTORY ON PCP ANALYZED

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 4 Jul 87 p 15

[Article by Jose Miguel Judice]

[Text] The old parties, well established in the social fabric, are better able to foresee electoral events and results than others more favored by electoral fortune, but less well organized. The Communist Party has few illusions about what will happen on 19 July. Perhaps for this reason, the strategy of the communists has a great deal more to do with the future in the medium-time range than with these elections.

For the CDU, one development emerges as probable: In all probability, Cavaco Silva will command a parliamentary majority. The communists have not obviously, ceased to hope that this will not be the case, and it is in fact true that it might not happen. But they are not about to operate on any assumption other than that within 15 days, the "right wing" will have a majority in the Assembly and almost a majority in the country. If this proves true, and basically, for Cunhal, everything indicates that it will, then there will be no further electoral periods until 1989 (when the elections for the European Parliament and the self-governing bodies will be held).

But beyond that, Cavaco's predictable majority will mean that the next legislative elections will have to be conducted, where the CDU is concerned, by someone other than Cunhal, even if he retains his post as secretary general. The years are not forgiving, and the inevitability of succession must be faced. To the point that it is Cunhal who is beginning to mention it. And as if this were not enough, a period of ebbing influence for the communist parties in Europe can clearly be foreseen, whatever strategic line they may adopt. And everything indicates that Cavaco's triumph will mean the beginning of the dismantling of the "Goncalvo state" in the economic sector, following the beginning of its dismantling in the institutional area with Sa Carneiro.

Given all these data, the political-strategic goals for the communists must be found within the "left wing." One might almost say that there was never an electoral period in which the "right-wing" adversary was such a secondary consideration for the PCP. And had this not been true, the separation from

the MDP/CDE, which will unmistakably mean a loss of votes in the sector of Cavaco Silva's adversaries, and to that extent, a minor contribution of aid to the present prime minister, would never have been possible.

What is most important to the communists now is the balance of forces in the left wing itself and the preparations for finding the successor to Alvaro Cunhal. For the first time, it has become clear that within a few years, the real conditions necessary for a serious electoral breakdown for the communists may come to exist, with the "Europeanization" of the country, the loss of the charismatic leader, economic development, and the changes in the electoral system. All of these things will work against the electoral weight of the communists, unless they are capable of adapting very rapidly and are able to do this on the basis of a situation in which the favorable factors will be mobilized to the greatest possible extent and the unfavorable ones understood and controlled.

The 19 July elections are therefore, and in this connection, an essential phase in the preparations for the future, and to a great extent, what will begin to happen shortly and how it will happen will depend on them. And therefore the communists must naturally avoid a very substantial decline in votes, although it is not really there that the heart of the problem lies. What is more important for them is to avoid the consolidation of any hegemony on the left, to avoid the development of a leading party like the PS was in the past. The ideal thing would be fluidity for the three parties which are very close together, as happened in 1985, and the essential thing is for the PRD to hold firm, although it may find itself with fewer deputies than the communists and its closest allies have.

If this happens, then the firmly seated conviction that there is no alternative for defeating Cavaco Silva other than collaboration among what the communists call the "democratic parties" will begin to develop within the Portuguese left wing. This would be facilitated in psychological terms by the probable modernization of the PCP, as a function of the preparations for the replacement of Cunhal, in political and generational terms, and as a function of the thaw in progress in the Soviet Union.

But if a chasm develops between the PS and the other leftist parties during the 19 July elections, then the psychological conviction which will grow in the left wing is that the only way of defeating Cavaco Silva in the future will be to concentrate votes on the Socialist Party, at the expense of the "useless" protest which a vote for the communists would be considered to be. In such a case, everything would become much more complicated for the communists in the coming years, and I do not even know whether we might not be faced with a situation in which the communists could, in less than 5 years, fall to a voting level clearly below 10 percent, as happened, moreover, in Spain.

Thus in these elections, the main adversary of the communists is again the Socialist Party, although on a basis very different from that which existed in the days of Mario Soares. Now it is no longer a question of trying to make the PS an adversary because, after all, it is a "rightist" party or because it faithfully serves the interests of the "right wing." Now the PS must be

regarded as a party of the "left" and unequivocally "democratic," because the strategy is to prepare for stable collaboration in the medium time range. But the PS must be an adversary, on the one hand because if it should develop greatly, this would be fatal for the communists (and Cunhal says that if the PS were strong it would be allied with the "right wing"), and on the other hand, because the struggle against Cavaco in the coming years will be a struggle of resistance and a social struggle (and in the opinion of the communists, the PS does not have the organization, nor is it sufficiently radical, for this type of battle).

But if the PS is the party-adversary, the PRD is by definition the party-ally, first of all for objective reasons. The greater the PRD becomes, the less the PS and the more balanced the three parties will become. And secondly, this is true because Ramalho Eanes is the desired presidential candidate from the point of view of communist support, in a strategy which will also serve as a basic step toward adaptation by the communists to modern times and the post-Cunhal era. And thirdly, a PRD resisting dissolution will function as an indirect factor in an endemic crisis within the PS, which will as of then be divided between the defenders of a process of moving closer to the "Eanists" and the opponents of such a development, with the certainty that an atmosphere of internal crisis in the PS will work toward the creation of an environment suited to great plans for future agreements.

For all of these reasons, one can better understand--and from another point of view--what I have been saying for some time now. These elections are crucial to the political issue of leftist development following the departure of Soares from the field. In this connection, the great debate for a "conscientious" leftist voter has to do with choosing among the various projects and the various strategies for arranging the political space of the opposition for the period following a Cavaco Silva triumph. This is why Vitor Constancio has totally unjustified in saying that 19 July will represent the third round of the presidential elections. On the contrary, what will happen on 19 July will be the first act in the new political reality resulting from the presidential elections, but on which they will have little influence, especially in the leftist sector. It would be an exaggeration to say that the left-wing primaries for the 1991 presidential elections will take place on 19 June. But what no one can doubt is that on 19 July, a new political cycle will begin in the leftist sector. As always, the communists were the first to perceive this.

5157

CSO: 3542/111

PCP'S CUNHAL: CAMPAIGN STYLE, REPLACEMENT, COMMENTED ON

Successful Campaigning

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 17 Jul 87 p 13

[Excerpts] With beige shoes, white jeans, and a light shirt, he is different; the bag under his arm is always the same. At times, a tablet is taken out of it on which Cunhal writes some notes from speeches of the candidates in the areas that he is visiting: local problems, which they discuss, and which Cunhal also discusses later. His speeches are not great, like those of Carlos Brito; they are not "kitsch," like those of the Verdes. He is always the same, whether it be south or north. His manner of delivery is what has changed. The words are more aggressive in the north and in Alentejo; and softer in Porto or Lisbon. The same remarks are delivered differently, depending on the people to whom are are addressed.

Alvaro Cunhal is the oldest leader of a Portuguese party, in age, 73 years, and in leadership. He is a kind of "movie star" of Portuguese politics. He is the only leader who has not been replaced; and he is a different leader, because he does everything possible not to resemble one. Instead of studying smiles, he seems to study serious expressions. He listens to the other speakers at the rallies with an impressive indifference. Only once in awhile does a smile appear; seldom a loud laugh. Little seems to touch him or evoke his emotion, other than the number of participants at the rallies, and the dynamics of the youth. Cunhal does not seem to take great pleasure in the crowds which run, trying to touch him, or in parents who attempt at all costs to have a 5-month old baby kiss him; he makes no victory gestures to the comrades who tell him to his face that they intend to vote for CDU [Democratic Center Union]; nor does he ever take a child on his lap to give him a typical leader's kiss. He does not sleep at hotels with the rest of the entourage, including reporters, as other leaders do, and he does not make jokes before the rallies. Cunhal conveys the image of the professional athlete, without time for fun. He is not unpleasant; and he does not treat reporters badly. He claims not to become annoyed at them. Sometimes, he dislikes the newspapers, or the articles that they print. In the view of the Communists, he is the example of the persecuted comrade; the example to which they clung when they, too, were persecuted. Sometimes, they seem to forget that there has already been a revolution.

In Aljustrel, Cunhal emerged from the car and a group of women ran toward him, thrilled, as if he were the man of their dreams, expending great effort on the Communist leader's security. And the men were also running. They wanted to touch him, to embrace him, and to tell him how much they liked him. But Cunhal has no time; and, at the end of every rally or every stop, he always confesses that he is very sorry not to be able to stay with them any longer: "Time is short...there are other comrades waiting to hear the CDU message."

Succession Discussed

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 31 Jul 87 p 10

[Excerpts] A mere comment by Alvaro Cunhal, admitting that the problems associated with his replacement might be debated at the next congress, caused the appearance of reports on his replacement as a consequence of the results accrued by CDU in the last elections.

This time, however, such "speculation" was not met merely with the ironic silence with which PCP usually receives its almost periodic rise. The combination of a second electoral blunder with the governmental consolidation of PSD [Social Democratic Party], Alvaro Cunhal's age, and the internal and international changes in the USSR per se has lent such "speculation" minimal probability, and has led to its vehement denial.

However, there is every indication that Alvaro Cunhal's replacement will continue to be a gradual process, led by himself. As early as the 1983 congress, it was his proposal to create the Central Committee's Standing Political Secretariat, and his testamentary "Party With Glass Walls" contains several instructions for the period following him.

And it was precisely for this reason that the reports of that forthcoming replacement could have the perverse effect of enabling the PCP leadership to isolate the voices within it discussing the need for a political change, owing to the 19 July results.

Immediately after the elections, the young PCP parliamentarian, Jose Magalhaes, was able to tell a weekly publication that the election results "entail questions not only about our orientation line, but also on the response that we as a party are giving to the real Portuguese situation."

Changes Don't Involve Replacement?

The idea that prevails among CDU voters appears to be that any alteration in the PCP political line and in its leadership does not involve the replacement of Alvaro Cunhal, and that it could be triggered only by him.

And, meanwhile, the electoral weakness of CDU itself, and the fact that readjustments in its political line have become inevitable, make the replacement of Alvaro Cunhal a more sensitive issue, apart from the time period in which it may occur.

How can the replacement of an uncontested leader mantled in the semi-legend that identifies his life with the very existence of PCP be planned? How would this be possible to do (and there is no interest now in learning whether there is anything deliberate in this) if no leader endowed with the prestige of a "heroic" past and an acknowledged intellectual capacity has shown up in recent years?

A Collegial Succession

The evidence is that no PCP leader at present has the qualification to succeed Alvaro Cunhal.

Some of the new PCP leaders are relatively well known. For example, this applies to the case of Jose Casanova. The fact that he is a worker who became an official without losing the features of an active militant enables him to create the bond between the apparat and the more active rank and file. But his rather naive voluntarism has prevented him from appearing as an alternative in terms of devising the political line. In other instances, such as that of Vital Moreira, and now, that of Jose Magalhaes, it is the social origin and professional specialization per se that have led them to be viewed with a certain amount of reservation. It was Alvaro Cunhal himself who theorized such reservations, claiming that PCP's technical and specialized cadres "run the risk" of political and ideological vacillation.

Other discoveries, such as Bernardina Sebastiao, from Alentejo, have only a regional prestige.

Of the old-guard leaders, none has the necessary prestige. And some recent appearances of Carlos Costa, Calos Brito, or Dias Loureiro, certainly reinforce that impression.

This is why there is currently a discussion among PCP members of the future creation of a board of directors, which could result from the expansion of new leaders in the Central Committee's Standing Political Secretariat, at the next congress, set for the first half of 1988. This solution would make it possible to reduce the friction between those two types of leaders, held off by the very prestige of Alvaro Cunhal, who should appear increasingly as a bridge between those leaders, continuing to endorse new leaders, such as Casanova or Victor Dias, with the guarantee of his past.

2909

CSO: 3542/115

COMMENTS ON PS, CONSTANCIO FUTURE, NEGOTIATIONS WITH PCP

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 25 Jul 87 p 9

[Text] The Socialist Party [PS] will act as the only agglutinating, credible, partisan political leader of the opposition, and will lend modern representation to its role in that state endeavor, taking account of the various conditions of legitimacy stemming from the elections. This position (according to an absolutely reliable source, very close to the PS secretary general) means that, in the realm of multilateral party relations, on the left, the Socialist leader would infer that any political negotiations with PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] (considered a party that "does not understand" the present political phenomenon, and hence is on a downward trend) are to be precluded; and, in connection with PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] (assessed as a "surplus party"), there will be no relations nor agreements established, based on a multiplicity of reasons, admitting only a few individual (re)entries into PS.

In the area of reorganizing the large institutions and the state's economic structure, our source thinks that PS must have a policy of openness regarding the constitutional revision, and take up again some of the points cited in the proposal for an agreement on the regime, made at the time by Vitor Constancio. The subject of our interview stressed that PS will strive to maintain the present proportional system which, it has been proven, allows for majorities; and, in this respect (also considered a "criterion" with regard to the constitutional revision), the Socialist Party "will only accept the correction of the present electoral districts."

Political Activities

There is consensus on the fact that, in PS, it is time to reconsider the party's political activities, and that this is the best time for doing so. Gama mentions a "significant readjustment of the policy of PS and its leadership organs." He explains that, "Vitor Constancio is not in question," and categorically declares: "This is the time for the revival of PS." Cardia is not asking for the secretary general's head. The latter is keeping silence concerning changes involving individuals and structure. But it is known what he thinks about the terms, conditions, and new requirements for political action. With the party spectrum "ironically" cleared by Cavaco's victory, considering the fact that "the bloc behind PSD [Social Democratic Party] is

too heterogeneous," and that the latter will be "tempted toward a moderate government," a source identified with Constancio has told us that "this changes the conditions for political activity slightly." And he explains: "In the first place, PS will have to keep up a lively dialogue with the society, from the standpoint of discussing solutions for the country's future. It will have to consider the sectors of the democratic left which shifted to PSD. Among other things, it will have to attach importance to the local government effort. And, finally, it must exercise the opposition in terms of that program, without too much aggressiveness, which would be inappropriately applied, in view of the election results. In other words, there must be humility, to grow and gain credibility. Also, from the standpoint of an internal redefinition, with repercussions on the political activity: "PS must attach value to its program. It is more moderate than that of the modern PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]. And it should publicize its government electoral program."

Internal Restructuring

The Alegre-Cardia "crisis" indicated the need to reorganize the PS leadership team, on the National Secretariat level, sooner and more extensively and thoroughly than Vitor Constancio was planning: more towards the end of the summer. Then, the leadership of the Parliamentary Group will be replaced and reshuffled. This restructuring will be as deep-seated as the Socialist leader's desire is to convert the "shadow government" into a cabinet with parliamentary spokesmen.

Also to be redefined will be the role of the office of studies so that (according to sources familiar with the secretary general's thinking) "there will cease to be three centers of power: the parliamentary group, the shadow government, and the office of studies); and it will be possible to unify the party's political leadership. According to persons of various persuasions in the party whom we contacted, the reorganization of the National Secretariat, moved ahead by the circumstances, will be a signal: Arons de Carvalho tells us that "Constancio is interested, and is probing," and that it would be desirable to replace Alegre and Cardia with "individuals of Jaime Gama's line," and even to have him, personally, enter. He refers us to what he said on television: "No, everything for remodeling; no to cosmetic solutions." As for Constancio, "In the realm of restructuring, all hypotheses are open, and have not yet been worked on." Among other sectors, the assessment is that the secretary general does not yet have a perception of the backing that he will have at the National Commission meeting next Saturday, 1 August. Therefore, silence is being kept.

2909

CSO: 3542/115

WERNER FOE IN COMMUNIST LEFT PARTY QUILTS PARLIAMENT SEAT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Jul 87 p 2

[Editorial: 'Jorn Svensson']

[Text] Jorn Svensson has decided to leave his seat in Parliament, which will consequently lose one of its more colorful characters. Svensson's reason for departing is a personal one, and is connected with his move to Jamtland.

But already at this year's Communist Left Party (VPK) congress, it was clear that the mainly pro-Werner Scandia electoral district was not going to be willing to extend the mandate for its Parliamentary delegate who had tried openly to overturn the party leader.

The power struggle in the VPK has remained undecided ever since Lars Werner was reelected and the politbureau at the same time maintained its pro-Werner majority. Following the congress, Svensson has been elected to chairman of the party's executive committee--a post which he does not intend leaving. It can also be expected that the political authorship which Svensson will now devote himself to is going to aim at influencing the debate inside the VPK--and that he would even be willing to assume C-H Hermansson's role as the party's leading ideologist.

Svensson supposedly is not going to be the party leader, despite earlier ambitions in that direction. But Svensson's defection from the Riksdag can hardly be seen as a victory for Lars Werner and the more-reform minded elements in the VPK.

/12913

CSO: 3650/187

NATIONALIST ACTION PARTY TRIAL REACTIONS

Commentary Criticizes Verdict

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 9 Apr 87 p 5

[Commentary by Ergun Goze]

[Text] The verdict was handed down in the NAP case. But it is not final. Legally speaking it has to go through the stages. It will go to appeal. Since the decision has not been finalized it is premature to pass judgment. And indeed it is the nation and then history which will ultimately pass judgment. In any case, all verdicts are handed down 'on behalf of the Turkish nation.'

Since we do not have the written opinion in our hand, what can one say? This much can and will be said: The case has undergone two stages. The first was the opening stage during which it really was not the party, the Assembly group that was on trial, but Turkish nationalism. It was as if they wanted to bring a sentence on Turkish nationalism.

Later, during the second stage, this atmosphere somewhat dissipated and the matter was lifted off the ideological plane. As it so happened, all members of the NAP General Executive Council have been acquitted. And the decision on Leader Alpaslan Turkes was not unanimous but a majority decision. Two judges dissented. The decision was predicated upon the alleged charge of forming an armed gang and Turkes was acquitted of the charge of assassinating Adana Police Chief Cevat Yurdakul and Kemal Turkler, DISK president.

While the sentence given to Turkes was 11 years, certainly not a very light sentence, and it is apparent that he has already served the required portion of the sentence (and it is said that serving an extra day he would clear the sentence altogether), he will be deprived of political rights for the rest of his life.

As I already pointed out, the real evaluation will be made after the decision is finalized. Perhaps the final decision will be acquittal. But one thing is for sure. Nothing worse than that will come out. Because these decisions constitute precedents which are difficult to overturn.

The second point deserving attention is the immediate response of Seyfi Oktay of SDPP, declaring: "Fascism is condemned." This is clearly an interference in the judicial process, trying to influence the Appeals Court on behalf of a political party, impelling them to confirm the decision. Though the Court will not take much notice of such pathetic moves that is what it amounts to. What if the Court overturns the decision? Would Oktay then say that the Court failed to condemn fascism, thus committing a crime?

Needless to say, throwing accusations of fascism around is a practice even the children in the street can see through. For more mature people it only evokes feelings of disgust and repugnance. Where are the fascist parties in the world today? Following Hitler's defeat, where are the remains of fascism? Turkey must be unique in this regard! But what is happening in Turkey is this: There are people in Turkey who, while proclaiming: "You cannot call everybody a communist," are throwing accusations of fascism at whoever happens to be around, and such people even parade as politicians.

There is a third angle in all this, perhaps more important than the rest. This case lasted 2168 days. During this period other cases of similar scope and magnitude were heard. One was the DISK case, and the other the case of the Peace Association. While these two cases were being heard, there was an intense campaign, within and particularly outside Turkey, to influence and save the defendants. Foreign press, the unions, political parties, European Council have all been brought into the fray, and the sympathizers of DISK and the Peace Association have organized demonstrations against the Turkish Republic abroad. The Communist 'Our Radio' issued threats to Turkish justice, and tried to belittle it. There have been attempts to send 'inspectors' to inspect the Turkish judicial system. And such deplorable efforts are still continuing.

According to a story from Athens reported in TERCUMAN yesterday, the leader of the disbanded Peace Association, Mahmut Dikerdem, has sent a message to a gathering in Athens asking for support.

During the course of the NAP case, however, there was no such effort, inside or outside the country. One may well wonder with regard to the absence of inside support, "Weren't these people loved at all?" But that kind of explanation would not hold for a party which has served in the government. All one can say is that they had put their trust in Turkish justice and had enough national pride not to ask for help from outside. The nation and everyone else was aware of that.

Yes, the remainder is a matter for the Appeals Court and the judicial system and ultimately the nation. It would transcend the scope of our article.

Turkes Appeals

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 10 Apr 87 p 8

[Text] Ankara -- The text of the appeal presented by Alpaslan Turkes to the 4th Corps 1st Military Court, to be forwarded to the Military Appeals Court, has been disclosed. In his appeal, Turkes claims that his verdict was in violation of procedure and law.

In the appeal Turkes points out that after 12 September 1980 it was claimed that during the search at NAP party headquarters "sufficient evidence was found indicating" that he and all other party executives "had ordered massacres in Turkey. Turkes goes on:

Furthermore, special legislation was brought out by the National Security Council (NSC) to enable investigations to be carried out about myself and other party executives. As openly stated in the charge, the order for the investigation had been given by the NSC.

After the preliminary investigation a case was brought against them demanding the sentence of death with the charge that they had engaged in massacres with a view to establishing a fascist state, Turkes said. He went on to say:

"Charging that the NAP had been turned into an armed gang, death sentences were demanded for all party executives. There was also a claim I carried responsibility as the instigator in the deaths of Kemal Turkler, DISK president, and Adana Police Chief Cevat

Yurdakul. I was incarcerated for 5 years as a result of my being subjected to such heavy charges, the falsity of which had been apparent from the very start. Even allowing for the evidence, the case should never have been brought out.

Even the Prosecutor

After the case running for years even the prosecutor had to concede that the charge of "ordering massacres to impose an order that is a reflection of fascist mentality" is patently false. Turkes went on:

While an acquittal would have been the proper thing to demand, an entirely new allegation has been made -- an allegation so far-fetched that nobody, even our opponents, had thought of it until then. The allegation, totally against the basic rules of Islam and contrary to the evidence in the case file, was that we had attempted to institute an unconstitutional regime by declaring a 'jihad' in contravention of the principle of secularism.

Testimony Under Torture

Despite testimonies extracted under torture it became plainly evident that he had nothing to do with any anarchic incident, declared Turkes. Though none of the ideas he held were against the Constitution, it had been decided to keep him in prison. Despite all the charges (that his party had become an armed gang), despite demands for death sentences for party executives, it was 'somewhat meaningful' that only he was given a sentence while all other party executives had been acquitted.

In the last section of his appeal Turkes writes:

Throughout the hearings no single idea or action could be attributed to me that could form the basis of a crime or was illegal. But despite that, and only due to my anticommunist ideas, I was depicted as a threat to public order. That is in violation of the law and of procedure. It is plainly obvious that this verdict is against our system of laws, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Charter and the decisions of the Superior Court. The decision was handed by judges some of whom had preconceived notions about our person and were far from being neutral. We have evidence to prove that. But I believe that this decision is one which will not be received with approval in the public conscience or by the Superior Court. One may also point out that the said judges have openly expressed their concern during the trials that the decision might be met with public misgivings, and that would somehow taint justice. So they

have excused themselves from the court. The verdict has demonstrated how right they were about the misgivings they felt about themselves, and their capacity to arrive at sound decisions.

Wife of Slain Labor Leader Appeals

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 10 Apr 87 p 8

[Text] The lawyers of the slain DISK president Kemal Turkler's wife Sebahat Turkler have posted an appeal on grounds that the sentences handed down in the NAP and 'Ulkucu' organizations case were inadequate. The appeal handed to Istanbul 2nd Martial Law Court, to be forwarded to Ankara 1st Military Court, claims that Turkler had been killed by order of Alpaslan Turkes.

The lawyers, Rasim Oz and Attila Coskun, who are representing Mrs Turkler, declared in the appeal that the NAP and 'Ulkucu' organizations have been charged with killing over 600 people, including Dogan Oz (state prosecutor) and Cevat Yurdakul, and conspiring to bring about mass incidents, like the one in Kahramanmaras and others, and that these charges had been substantiated.

12466

CSO: 3554/239

BRIEFS

NEW MEMBERS FOR ANAP -- On the heels of Antalya deputy Kadri Altay, Istanbul Independent deputy Resit Ulker joined the ranks of ANAP yesterday. At a ceremony which took place before the CEAC meeting Ozal congratulated Ulker by placing the ANAP insignia on his lapel. Thus, ANAP seats in the Assembly reached 253. Meanwhile, during Ozal's arrival at party headquarters a group of turbaned students wanted to get near Ozal but the security men prevented them from doing so. [Excerpt] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 9 Apr 87 p 7] Ankara -- Corum Independent deputy Besim Gocer and Malatya Independent deputy Ilhan Dincel joined ANAP yesterday. Consequently ANAP seats in the Assembly reached 255. Gocer had resigned from SDPP, Dincel was a founding member of the Populist Party. Speaking at the ceremony General Secretary Mustafa Tasar said, "The joining of the two deputies is the latest example of the high regard in which our party is held." Tasar noted that ANAP was open to anyone adopting its principles and would continue to be so. Haydar Ozalp, ANAP caucus deputy chairman, and Corum deputy Unal Akkaya were also present at the ceremony. The latest distribution of seats at the Assembly are as follows: ANAP (255), SDPP (64), CWP (35), DLP (24), Independent (20), vacant (2). [Text] [Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 10 Apr 87 p 5] 12466

CSO: 3554/239

NAVY'S COMMANDER ON READINESS STATE, STANDARD FLEX SYSTEM

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Jul 87 p 4

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Sea Powers' Little Brother Compares Well With Big Ones"]

[Text] "The Navy's Operational Command watches over us day and night 365 days a year. It takes care of the environment, saves the shipwrecked, defends sovereignty, and is ready to go to war if it becomes necessary," Rear-Admiral Jorgen F. Bork says.

"We can only prevent a war if we have ships and men who can demonstrate performance ability of such quality that an attack must take them properly into account," the head of the Naval Operations Command, Rear-Admiral Jorgen Frits Bork, who on 22 July will be 60, said.

"I look forward with great confidence to the coming great power discussions of a double zero solution on a reduction of nuclear weapons, but I do not doubt for a minute that we must be enormously aware of the conventional balance," the rear-admiral continued, who supports the defense chief, Admiral S.E. Thiede, in the latter's demand for a yearly increase of the defense budget by 800 million kroner.

"It is necessary if we are to keep the defense we have."

Rear-Admiral Bork went into the Navy in the summer of 1945. "I was seized by the national mood in the summer of liberation, and I held the flag so high my legs left the ground, as the communist leader Axel Larsen described it some years later," he said.

It is quite characteristic of Bork to use this quote on himself. He is one of the Navy's most unimposing and popular leaders. The little admiral with the wide, smiling, white-bearded face enjoys just as much respect among NATO colleagues in the great power fleets as among enlisted men and conscripts. Through the years he has not gone wrong in telling the British staff college that Nelson lost the Battle of Rheden, in inviting Lill Babs for champagne during a fleet visit in Oslo, or in sending a keg of beer below decks when Denmark won the world championship in soccer.

"It is interesting that it has fallen my lot to further today's cooperation with the Germans," he says. standing and gesturing eagerly under a picture of Peter Tordenskjold in Naval Operations Command headquarters in Arhus.

It is quite clear that we are the little brother in this cooperation. It is also clear that little brother can be effective if he is smart, and we are that."

Sea Rescue and Environmental Protection

It is Jorgen Bork who leads the fleet's peacetime operations at sea, primarily guarding the sea lanes, asserting sovereignty, and performing rescue service, and it is he who, if the worst should come, will lead the fleet in crisis or war.

"We work around the clock 365 days a year. Of the tasks we carry out, sea rescue is the best known. The headquarters in Arhus coordinates all rescue operations that take place on water, even in lakes and marshes, while the Air Force, which has its own rescue center, takes care of all rescue operations on land.

The Naval Operational Command supports the civilian community in fighting pollution on the seas and provides assistance to shipping in many ways. We work together with the civilian radio stations, regulate traffic through the Large Belt, and exercise police authority on the seas.

At Combat Fleet Expense

"I would like to stress that the Navy to a very special degree solves a series of civilian tasks by its presence, its purview, and its equipment. And it is worrisome to me that this takes place at the expense of the combat fleet, which I have the responsibility for.

"I mean that today we have a modern Danish fleet at our disposal, with an operational ability the likes of which we have never had in the 42 years I have spent in the Navy. Our crews are well trained, highly motivated, and professional in the best sense of the word. But I am greatly concerned about the future because of the undermining that is taking place.

For reasons of economy we have had to reduce the fleet's crews by 300 men. In 1985 in the recent Danex maneuvers we had 19 ships with 1,022 men, in 1986 we had 17 units with 870 men, and this year only 12 ships with 572 men. This is a dangerous trend.

"We have a serviceable fleet today, but this does not mean that there is not need for a renewal in several areas. This should partially be solved by the new Standard Flex 300 system, in which it is thought that the individual hull, with the help of a series of interchangeable modules, will be able to be used for various tasks. The effectiveness will depend upon obtaining a sufficient number of modules."

The rear-admiral complains that the frigates are on the way out. This removes

the capability for air defense at sea, for protection against mine fields, and for defense of the link between land areas and the landing of allied reinforcements.

"We cannot exist on small units alone. I remember an article I once read in an issue of FAEDRELANDET from 1857," Bork concluded. "It said, 'Just because Denmark is a small country, we do not have to build ships as if we were getting furniture for a doll's house.'"

9124

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VALMET HOPES L-90 TP REDIGO TRAINER TO GET EXPORT ORDERS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 23 Jun 87 p 4

[Article by Borje Hielm: "On the Art of Selling Airplanes"]

[Text] This year Finland was represented by two airplane types at the 37th international aviation fair in Paris. Actually there were three there, for the French Siren firm has been selling the Finnish-built mechanized glider, PIK-20E, for almost 10 years now under the designation PIK-30. It represented a national economic loss in the millions that Eiri Oy in Lahti failed to get a subsidy from the development fund to develop the airplane model and therefore decided to sell the production rights to the French company. Over the years the PIK-20 was our major trump card on the export market, with over 180 planes sold in the United States alone. How unfortunate!

But Oy Valmet AB is a serious contender. The product is known as Valmet L-90 TP Redigo, a turboprop training plane with parallel seats. Valmet's international advertising campaign stresses that the final training of a fighter pilot will be half a million dollars cheaper with Redigo, because it is possible to go directly from the Redigo to a fighter training plane like Bae Hawk. Valmet also showed the Finnish Air Force's current training plane, the Vinka, known here by the international name of Valmet L-70 Miltrainer. However in the daily airplane demonstrations it had more of a supporting role to show how much better the Redigo is than the Vinka. The joint aerobatics sequence toward the end of the fair in which the Vinka and the Redigo performed loops, rolls and sideslips together was certainly a perfect performance that attracted well-deserved attention.

Valmet Oy met with interested prospective buyers in its "chalet." No definite sales results can be reported, but Marketing Vice President Per Falenius kindly granted HUFVUDSTADSBLADET's representative an interview that provided a little more information than the official press releases.

The unofficial reports in Finland of a sale of 10 Redigo planes to the Finnish Air Force as a replacement for the light Piper Arrow III and Arrow IV liaison planes were confirmed in Paris.

Per Falenius also told us about the Redigo sales campaign. About 130 potential customers have been contacted, not just national defense ministers but also foreign trade ministers, air ministers, defense ministers and our own trade delegations.

Valmet's advertising campaign is based on showing that the Redigo is not just a military plane but an economical training plane. Two-page advertisements in the biggest international aviation periodicals stressed this image of the Redigo.

Per Falenius is optimistic; after Paris the Redigo will be demonstrated in some 10 European countries and the firm is actively seeking cooperation partners for its production. Valmet made an active effort to market the Redigo at this year's Le Bourget fair. Grafia Oy's contest for the top campaign of 1986, "Vuoden Huiput 1986," was won by Redigo and OH-VTP's color composition also received an award in the graphics series. And what did this whole campaign cost? We did not get a definite answer to that question, but "a million marks isn't very much in this context," according to Per Falenius.



Valmet's new training plane, Redigo, was demonstrated at the 37th international aviation fair in Paris.

6578

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FINNISH BOOK ON WWII UNIT CATALYST FOR COMMAND REFORM

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 22 Jun 87 p 3

[Article by Stefan Forss: "Leadership and Cooperation in the Armed Forces"]

[Text] In recent years there has been a lot of interest in the issues of leadership, cooperation and discipline, especially among western defense forces. There are many reasons for this. The postwar process of democratization which has extended to most civilian sectors, especially in working life, makes the defense forces' traditional forms of activity stand out in sharp contrast to the values that are normally associated with a democratic society. This development is unacceptable. Therefore efforts are being made in several countries to better adjust the armed forces to social developments in general. At the same time it should be realized that the military cannot possibly accept reforms that would lead to a deterioration of its performance in wartime or periods of crisis. Thus the important question is whether an army's activities can be made more democratic without reducing its performance.

It is somewhat ironic that Sweden, which has lived in peace since 1814, has perhaps done the most to implement this process. In doing so the Swedes have been able to make use of Finnish wartime experiences to a large extent. Naturally the big band of Swedish volunteers who took part in our war represent a valuable source of knowledge. In addition it should be mentioned that several well-known front-line fighters moved to Sweden after the war. Harry Jarv, PhD, is perhaps the most prominent name in this context. His influence is apparent in a number of military debate and instruction books that have been issued since the end of the 1970's.

It is obvious that Swedes' own direct wartime experiences are strongly tilted toward the grassroots level. This is because most of the volunteers were young and only a few of them functioned at a higher level than that of company commander. This has led Swedes engaged in military research to take an entirely different approach than they do in this country in examining the question of leadership and cooperation from the point of view of the man at the bottom.

Israel's experiences are also of some interest in this connection. (The Swedes made a real catch in the mid-1970's when the Israeli Army's chief

psychologist, Ben Shalit, moved to Sweden and eventually became a Swedish citizen.)

In Sweden the discussion stage is now over and decisions have begun to be implemented. The new instruction book, "The Commander & Leadership," will certainly make many old career officers choke on their coffee. The book also contains the Commander in Chief's basic view of leadership and co-operation, written in 1981. He says among other things that people are the defense forces' most important resource and that people's different personal experiences, interests and abilities should be utilized.

In the Finnish Army one of the overriding goals in training has always been to teach soldiers obedience. "It takes a little longer (than it used to), of course, for they (young people) do not fear authority. But when they have realized the importance of discipline it is a pleasure to stand before the troops," said the commander of the Nyland Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Lars Stenstrom, speaking at a veterans' ceremony some time ago. (HUFVUD-STADSBLADET, 26 April)

This is a common attitude among Finnish military people. Its correctness has never been officially questioned. On the contrary, it seems to be a widely held opinion among our military career men that our system, which has its roots in totalitarian imperial Germany, functions well even today.

However this is a distortion of history. During the war years the Prussian discipline functioned poorly at the front. There is a great deal of evidence to support this. Perhaps the most important is Professor Knut Pipping's sociological doctoral dissertation, "The Company as Society--Observations in a Finnish Front-Line Unit, 1941-44" from 1947 along with Vaino Linna's "Unknown Soldier." Both books describe the objective facts as well as possible.

It is typical that Pipping's internationally esteemed work was first re-discovered in this country 30 years after the book came out in Swedish. Mollberg's new film version of "Unknown Soldier" led to some discussion in the military journal, SOTILASAIKAKAUSLEHTI (No 1, 1986). The emphasis in several of the articles is odd; one inevitably wonders if the authors had any understanding of either Linna's text or Mollberg's film. The affinity with some of our wartime generals' perceptions of "Unknown Soldier" is all too apparent.

Even now military people in our country do not seem to have lost their ambivalence about "Unknown Soldier." In Sweden, on the other hand, they find the novel's message valid; in the extensive bibliography of the book on leadership referred to above, "Unknown Soldier" is listed as one of the 10 most important works.

Six months ago a Finnish work was published that is now being studied with interest in Sweden, but unfortunately it has not yet received any notice in the Finnish military press. This is Nils-Erik Nykvist's excellent history of IR 61. In his review of the book, bank director Goran

Stjernschantz called it a memorial, but it is much more than that. I think the people who prepared the Swedish book on leadership will read "The 61st" with great satisfaction; the fate of the regiment more than 40 years ago confirms the central ideas in the new instruction book.

Modern warfare is characterized by high speed and rapidly changing situations. It requires both flexible leadership and initiative on the part of individual soldiers to function effectively under these circumstances. These are among the qualities that are needed for quick reconnaissance missions in wartime.

Harry Jarv was one of the army's most outstanding men in this area. He writes in "The 61st": "When combat began everyone in the group acted independently but we still all worked together. One cannot plan close combat in detail, it happens so quickly that orders can seldom be given and therefore each man must assess developments for himself and decide how to act in relation to the others in the group. Our opponents had much better discipline in the formal sense and usually waited for orders before they did anything, even when situations demanded quick action, which was impractical. Our informal methods were based on the competent individual's natural initiative and justified self-confidence. Inner discipline was more effective than superimposed external discipline.

"Our pragmatic way of carrying out tasks was actually contrary to accepted military precepts, but they did not mind using us because it produced results."

Jarv led more than 200 patrols before he stepped on a mine in September 1943 and received serious injuries.

After the big assault on the Isthmus of Karelia began, he reported for active duty again in spite of his injuries and served as a platoon leader at Ihantala. I once asked him how he could possibly have done this. He replied briefly and in a low voice: "Well, I couldn't run, but on the other hand I thought we wouldn't be doing that any more."

Lieutenant Colonel Fredrik Reuterswärd, who served as a volunteer himself in the continuation of the war, is one of the leading Swedish experts on the questions that have been raised. Loyalty and the spirit of self-sacrifice--qualities that Jarv and many others displayed to an exceptional degree--are words of honor as far as he is concerned. He feels that the spirit of self-sacrifice cannot be created by just any form of discipline or military training. Most of the young platoon leaders and company commanders "accepted it as a natural and inevitable thing to sacrifice themselves at the head of their units. When the leader fell the next man just as naturally took the place of the one who had fallen and continued the fight. And a sufficient number of soldiers were prepared to follow these leaders to an anticipated death. Apart from the contribution of capable strategic and tactical leadership, it was on this decisive point that the Finns passed the test."

Professor Lars-Erik Taxell's contribution to "The 61st" confirms modern Swedish thinking. He writes that the spirit of the regiment was ultimately determined by the relationships between the people who lived, worked and fought together. The commander of the regiment, "Colonel Marttinen was strict and demanding but he did not base his leadership on harsh discipline. Orders were carried out collectively. Especially at the company and support base level, where the leaders were reserve officers with roots in civilian work and ways of thinking, a natural solidarity sprang up that was reaffirmed in work, danger and combat. To a large extent the attitude was that tasks should be performed jointly and that individuals took their share of the responsibility for doing so. There was comradeship and trust that cut across all ranks and positions." Not everyone lived up to these demands "but most did what one could reasonably expect and demand."

Taxell praises the young officers in particular: "I want to make special reference to company and platoon leaders, their competence and endurance, their readiness to bear the heavy responsibility for the men entrusted to them which acted as a strong and cohesive force. The group of officers--with a very small proportion of officers in active service--met high demands. There were very few who could not or would not do what was required of them."

The defensive engagements at Tienhaara near Viborg were the final test of strength for IR 61. A broken front line would have opened a direct route to Helsinki. Col Marttinen's personal effort was of decisive importance for the standoff victory "along with the individual efforts of many others as leaders and combatants." One can say that the vast majority of the soldiers in the regiment here displayed exemplary inner discipline under the most adverse conditions and in the face of overwhelming superior force.

There is a great contrast between IR 61 and the 20th Brigade that fled from Viborg in this respect. A number of unfortunate circumstances contributed to the brigade's defenses breaking down almost without putting up a fight. The formal discipline that had been instilled in the young recruits collapsed very quickly. The principle of unconditional obedience was far from being sufficient. On the contrary, it was detrimental to the defense system in a practical matter that proved to be very important. In spite of the fact that there was an obvious need for ammunition, a zealous supply clerk refused to issue ammunition because the "necessary" formal transfer document was missing. Powerless officers tried to halt the panic-stricken flight to the mainland with armed threats. A few days later IR 61 assumed responsibility for the front there.

It is an unfortunate fact that the lessons learned in the war have not been utilized in military training in this country. Cooperation is an almost unknown word in the military vocabulary. In Swedish military training, on the other hand, cooperation has a definite place and recruits are allowed to take the initiative and bear responsibility themselves.

In this context one inevitably thinks of one of the many insights in "The Commander & Leadership"--if you cannot win the confidence of your subordinates in peacetime it is doubtful that they will follow you in wartime.

A positive development can now be seen in this country too. The military authorities are working on similar reforms. One hopes that this will not result in any half measures. One also hopes that professional military men will have the courage to gradually start freeing themselves from their mesmerized adherence to the infantry's Prussian heritage.

In conclusion I would like to quote Fredrik Reuterswärd: "If coercion and compulsion lie behind the 'tough discipline' many military forces apply, there is no reason to be impressed. It is a sign of weakness, not strength. Democracies have every reason to go their own way on these matters."

Defense Minister Ole Norrback has a lot of very urgent work to do in this area. He has a chance to carry on the Finnish-Swedish military heritage and make a unique contribution to the whole country.

6578

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DEFENSE EXPERT ANALYZES STRATEGIC POLICY OPTIONS

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Summer 87 pp 137-153

[Article by Francois Heisbourg, former diplomat, assistant general director of Thomson International, director designate of the International Institute for Strategic Studies of London (beginning September 1987) and the author, among other publications on defense problems, of "La puce, les hommes et la bombe" [The Flea, Men and the Bomb], Hachette, 1986 (in collaboration with Pascal Boniface) and "The Conventional Defense of Europe," Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1986 (collective work): "French Defense: The Impossible Status Quo"]

[Text] French defense policy is characterized by a fundamental conflict between independent decision-making concerning the use of military forces, on one hand, and the requirements of alliance treaties, on the other. The consequences of this duality are not necessarily unfavorable for France or for its allies: thus during the "Euromissiles" crisis, it was better that the Alliance had a France that supported "its" consensus rather than one that was beset by pacifist and anti-American groups similar to those that have cropped up in other countries. Moreover, independence and solidarity are not necessarily contradictory: in certain circumstances, the responsibilities arising from these two requirements may coexist without being harmful.

Finally, the conflict between strictly national requirements and obligations deriving from membership in a larger community is not peculiar to France, even if it is more apparent in the case of France. Full NATO members, while publicly advertising the automatic nature of their commitments in the Atlantic Alliance, are no less subject to the pressures of their own national interests. Such tensions are apparent both in actual behavior during crises (for example: the withdrawal, without prior consultation, of one-third of the British Navy from the North Atlantic during the Falkland Islands conflict) and in the political decision-making mechanisms provided for implementing defense measures.

Thus it would be a mistake to claim that French defense policy is inconsistent or aberrant. Conversely, considering this policy to be immutable would be a serious mistake, for it must be adapted simultaneously to changes in the international environment and to reasonably available resources. If these factors change profoundly, the very bases of our defense will have to be reviewed. The present consensus is not an end in itself but merely a

significant factor among others, whose existence may reinforce a policy, whether it is good or bad.

Today, however, there are several major developments that could jeopardize maintaining the status quo, i.e., the constant delicate balance between our demand for national independence and active solidarity with our allies. If our country does not take corrective measures in time, it could well find itself, nolens volens, faced with an absurd choice: either continental isolationism--impossible from the outset due to geography--or the abandonment of entire aspects of our sovereignty for the sake of a solidarity that has become ineffective because it has been directed, too late, toward a Europe undergoing "finlandization."¹

The End of the Post-War Period in Europe

Since "the great division" of the 1940s, the situation in Europe has been characterized by three constants: a strong Soviet military threat, most often accompanied by slow diplomacy combining intimidation and persuasion, all against a background of social and institutional immobility; a U.S. guarantee of security in the form, beginning in 1950, of the presence of significant U.S. conventional forces, and the subsequent installation of nuclear weapons, in Europe as the strategy of massive reprisals lost credibility; a Western Europe that is politically balkanized but still committed to building an economic community and loyal to its membership in the Atlantic Alliance.

Variations of these constant themes have occasionally been noted: in the USSR, the Khrushchevian interlude; in the United States, the attempts to reduce U.S. forces at the instigation of Senator Mansfield; in Europe, France's withdrawal as a full member of NATO and the major pacifist demonstrations in full NATO member countries in the early 1980s.

At no time in the past have such atypical developments occurred simultaneously. But this is no longer true today. And the possibility cannot be ruled out that the combination of new Soviet behavior, U.S. attitudes toward Europe and the contrasting attitudes of Europeans may result in a reappraisal of the landscape inherited from the last world war; and consequently, in profound negative or positive changes in our security conditions.

Under Mr Gorbachev's leadership, the USSR has initiated significant internal reforms. The meaning and extent of these attempts to transform the country are nevertheless still enigmatic. Is Mr Gorbachev a new Peter the Great, a Deng Xiaoping, or another Dubcek? No one knows. But it is a fact: the USSR is changing. Although the military threat remains intact and the long-term goals of Soviet diplomacy appear unchanged (to bring about the

¹The term is not meant to be insulting to a Finland that is not "finlandized"--specifically because its will to defend itself can be supported by a coalition of free countries.

denuclearization of Europe in order to weaken the U.S. security guarantee), Moscow's foreign policy is now a mixture of agility and seduction.

The new Soviet course has already had significant effects on the cohesiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. Acceptance of the "double zero option" concerning Euromissiles could, if the Allies are not careful, open the way for a U.S.-Soviet "major agreement" that would affect security conditions in a Europe which has been pushed toward denuclearization. This would not necessarily displease the FRG, which sometimes sees what it wants to see in Soviet developments: the possibility of relaunching the inter-German policy and the opening of East European and Soviet markets. The FRG has even declared that it is prepared to endorse concepts such as the "joint European house."² The USSR will no doubt find a propitious basis for all its seductive operations in such automatic West German reactions.

In a certain way, the current preoccupations of the United States are a response to the Soviet "new policy." First of all, reactions to the so-called "Star Wars" speech (on 23 March 1983) and to the Reykjavik "pre-summit" have shown that a portion of the American public, even its enlightened members, was inclined to seek security formulas not based on nuclear deterrence.

Added to this danger is a questioning of the level of U.S. forces stationed in Europe. Traditionally, the problem resurfaces every time economic or political differences arise between Europe and America: quarrels over "sharing the burden"; international trade disputes; reactions to constraints that Europeans place on the use of NATO military resources outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.

These factors, none of which is recent, have thus far been inadequate to bring about a major reduction of U.S. forces.³ But their effect could be strengthened by an insoluble dilemma: the limitations placed on the U.S. military budget. During the 1986 and 1987 fiscal years, military spending authorizations reportedly dropped by nearly 7 percent. And it is likely that the next U.S. administration will not have the necessary margin of economic maneuvering room to prevent a stagnation or weak growth of the defense budget. Considering the commitments it has already made elsewhere, the United States

²Cf. in particular Mr Genscher's speech at the "World Economic Forum" in Davos on 1 February 1987 ("Chancen einer zukunftsfähigen Gestaltung der West-Ost Beziehungen" [Chances of a Possible Future Structuring of East-West Relations]).

³For a defense of U.S. neoconservative views against deployment of forces in Europe, see the book by Melvin Krauss, "How NATO Weakens the West," Simon & Shuster, 1987.

will have difficulty preventing the axe from falling on European-based forces.

Thus Europeans should be prepared for a reduction of the U.S. conventional potential, particularly in the FRG⁵--for such budgetary restrictions affect the combat capability of units or the very structure of the forces. European geopolitics would not necessarily be upset if other factors remained constant. But as it happens, this is not the case.

Europe is also being pulled in different directions, without it being possible to predict which among all these factions will finally prevail: centrifugal (balkanization) or centripetal (European pillar of the Alliance) forces; those in favor of "finlandization" or steadfastness; those favoring Euro-isolationism or strategic coupling within the Alliance....

The United Kingdom is gradually becoming receptive⁶ to defense cooperation in European locations, more particularly with France. But it remains to be seen how London will reconcile this necessary rapprochement with the Anglo-American "special relationship" established by the 1958 nuclear accords and the 1947 agreements on intelligence operations.

And not so very long ago, the FRG was a tireless promoter of European construction, built to a great extent around the Paris-Bonn duo; this no longer seems to be a German priority. The FRG is now turning more and more toward the United States--particularly in the very important area of arms

⁴(For a more detailed analysis of this problem, see "Can the Atlantic Alliance Last Out the Century?" by Francois Heisbourg in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, London, May 1987, published in POLITIQUE ETRANGERE under the title "Europe/Etats-Unis: le couplage strategique menace" [Europe/United States: The Strategic Coupling Threatened], Spring 1987.)

⁵(At different times and for different reasons, men as dissimilar as Mr Kissinger (in 1983), Senator Nunn (in 1984) and Mr Brzinsky (in 1987) have suggested reductions of up to 90,000 or 100,000 troops, or the equivalent of two divisions and their supporting units.)

⁶(See in this regard the speech by British Defense Minister George Younger describing the advantages of the WEU, at the "Wehrkunde" [Defense Science] conference in Munich, January 1987.)

⁷(The 1947 agreements concluded between the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (withdrew in 1986) provide for sharing intelligence: thus the Cheltenham electronic listening center (Government HQ) in England supplies information to the U.S. NSA (National Security Agency). The Anglo-American accords of 1958 provide for cooperation in the military nuclear area, with the United Kingdom being exempt from U.S. legislation forbidding third countries from having access to U.S. data in this area.)

acquisition--as though a softening of the U.S. security guarantee obliged Bonn to anticipate Washington's wishes, in the hope of countering separatist trends. At the same time, the natural desire to maintain close political and social relations with the GDR, to reduce the extent of the Soviet threat and to regain influence and outlets in Central Europe, is causing the FRG to look toward the East. The virtual risk of a "dual dependency" or of a major withdrawal is certainly there.

Besides the Benelux and Scandinavian allies, whose military and political weight and roles appear relatively stable, Italy and Spain in particular should be mentioned.

Italy can now claim a status comparable to that of the three "major" European countries: in 1986, Italy's GNP actually exceeded the United Kingdom's. Although Italian military expenditures are still less than the general average (only 2.4 percent of its GNP), their cumulative rate of increase has been rapid: 13 percent from 1980 to 1986, as opposed to 7.5 percent for France, 3.4 percent for the FRG and 12 percent for the United Kingdom.⁸ The technological level of the Italian defense industry is equal to or even above that of the FRG in several specialized areas (electronic countermeasures, certain optoelectronic systems ...). Italy still has to intensify its military effort and, above all, to change its diplomacy, although it is stable and "Euro-Atlantic," into an active resolve. This Italian vitality is probably one of the few great assets a deliberate policy of European construction could have.

Spain, although lagging behind the Italian potential, will be induced to occupy a larger place in Europe and in the Alliance. With its EEC and NATO membership, its application for WEU membership, and a fully developing defense industry, Spain is becoming an increasingly prominent figure as it emerges on the European stage following a long period of political-strategic quasi-isolation.

As we can see, Europe is permeated with various factions, the result of which remains uncertain. Insofar as the various European partners have not yet made their choices, France's position will exert a considerable influence that will by far exceed its economic and military potential. This is why the signals emitted by Paris in the post-Reykjavik period will have to be gauged with extreme care. We must, urgently, make sure that a high degree of cohesion is maintained on the European level. As for the "zero option," not only must the basis of the problem and the overall strategic context be considered, but also our ability to contribute to a joint European response. It is better to stick to language that is apt to unify the allies, rather than trying to expound some so-called truth in isolation.

⁸Including the cost of the Falkland Islands war.

Resources and Directions

In this uncertain context, French defense policy will have to consider the level of available resources.

Before determining priorities, the defense effort apt to be approved by the nation must be assessed. Based on NATO definitions, in 1987 France devoted approximately 4.1 percent of its GNP to defense. If we internalize non-budgetary savings, i.e., the cost of conscription in comparison to a volunteer army of comparable strength--this figure amounts to more than 4.6 percent of the GNP. Excluding the hypothesis of a serious international crisis, it is rather unlikely that this percentage can be increased significantly, even allowing for full implementation of the 1987-91 defense appropriations act (affecting military materiel but not the total expenditures of the armed forces).

We should add that past experience is not encouraging, since none of the three previous defense appropriations acts was 100-percent implemented. Moreover, the new appropriations act stipulates in its Article 3 that "funds appropriated for ... 1989, 1990 and 1991 may be reviewed in relation ... to the economic situation." And the sorry state of the French economy calls for urgent public expenditures for "research and development" and productive investment. It would therefore be unreasonable, in the next several years, to expect military spending to grow faster than the GNP, or approximately +2 percent per year in volume, everything else being equal.

Considering the development of resources and costs, is it possible for France, alone, to continue to maintain the forces of a "mini-superpower": a "U.S.-style" navy--the only one, along with the U.S. Navy, to have two groups of "long" aircraft carriers; the only Western air force to have maintained the same number of aircraft for more than 15 years; the only complete nuclear triad¹⁰ in Europe; an army almost twice as large as its British counterpart?...

Even disregarding external events that could lead us to alter our choices, the growing inadequacy between our resources and the structure of our forces will inevitably lead to a reconsideration of the latter. Since current planning can be changed, it would be better to quickly redefine certain major programs rather than being forced to cancel some of them while they are in

⁹ Between 1970 and 1985, the number of combat aircraft declined by 17 percent in the United Kingdom (RAF), by 40 percent in the FRG (Luftwaffe), by 50 percent in the United States (USAF), compared with only 5 percent in France (Armee de l'Air). These figures were taken from "The Military Balance," published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (1970 and 1985/86).

¹⁰ 297,000 men and women for France; 162,000 for the United Kingdom (1986).

progress, or to stagger them over certain time periods (with all the additional expense that would entail). A mobile strategic missile, a successor to the M.4 missile, a broad array of pre-strategic nuclear weapons, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, a combat aircraft with French project direction . . . : these are certainly great ambitions for a country whose defense budget is less than that of the United Kingdom!

A new defense policy should be centered around three main goals:

- 1) Absolutely maintaining the deterrent capability of a second nuclear strike. Giving priority to deterrence does not amount to archeo-Gaullism, but rather to remembering an obvious truth, accepted by every nuclear power, including our British neighbor. The possession of such minimal deterrent capability is still a major contribution to everyone's security, whether argued in terms of mission (detering an attack, thanks to the multiplicity of decision-making centers) or cost-effectiveness. Such a priority does not imply, however, an unrestrained development of nuclear resources.
- 2) The need to compensate, to the (limited) extent possible, for a reduction of the U.S. security guarantee, using both political and military resources. This goal implies establishing new defense relationships with our European allies, and with the FRG in particular, in view of its geostrategic position. We should note that this would not be the first time that France would have to take measures intended to compensate for an attenuation of the strategic Euro-American coupling: the construction of the French strategic nuclear force expressed, among other things, Paris' resolve to have some kind of insurance if the United States decided to change from "massive reprisals" to a "graduated response."
- 3) Outside Europe, France must be able to define its ambitions realistically and pursue them with a minimum of resources. Our policy should derive from specific interests which are our own, and not from abstract aspirations. We do not have to carry alone the burdens of more general interest, as in the Middle East and in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, the close and mutually beneficial ties established between France and its allies in central and western Africa fully justify its military effort, even limiting ourselves to a strict criterion of cost-effectiveness. Similarly, our country has good reasons for maintaining forces, as an expression of its sovereignty, in the non-European parts of its territory as long as the local populations wish us to do so.

In contrast--let us repeat--such presence is not absolutely necessary in the Near East or in the waters around the Arabian Peninsula: the problems of the Islamic world do not arise--or no longer arise--on the scale of our country alone; these are tasks befitting a continent and not a medium-size power. That should not, however, prevent us from engaging in trade: moreover, the United Kingdom and Italy understand as well, or even better, than ourselves what it means to be able to penetrate the civilian and military markets of that area of the planet.

Following the same logic, is it really necessary to base 3,500 troops in Djibouti, which costs us several billion francs a year?¹¹ Do we really need to have the Third Fleet in the Indian Ocean? Is it really necessary to have two groups of "long" aircraft carriers?

In reality, the resources needed for a defense policy centering on European cooperation within the Alliance will have to derive from the definition of a realistic threshold sufficiency for our nuclear forces and from a substantial reduction of our expenditures "outside Europe."

Priorities and Programs

Maintaining the credibility of our strategic nuclear deterrence capability raises the problem of determining our threshold of sufficiency. This threshold--in our case as well as in the case of the British and Chinese--depends to a large extent on the USSR's strategic plans: antimissile defenses and antisubmarine warfare are two key variables in this regard. The reality of the former (the antimissile network around Moscow and the fragility of the ABM treaty) and the obstacles encountered by the latter (advances in acoustical concealment) should encourage France to take a threefold course of action: continuation, as planned, of the program for recasting nuclear missile-launching submarines (SNLE) into multiwarhead M.4 missiles; construction of the first new-generation nuclear missile-launching submarine (SNLE-NG) and timely scheduling of others in order to replace current SNLE; beginning, during the present planning stage, exploratory development of the M.4's successor (the M.5) in time for the first major streamlining of the "Inflexible" SNLE (around the year 2000).

These projects are justified regardless of the progress of current negotiations for strategic arms reduction. In fact, the 50-percent reduction in the number of strategic nuclear warheads under discussion in Geneva would still leave the Soviet Union with a potential equivalent to what it had in the late 1970s....

In contrast, a decision on the SX (or S.4) mobile strategic missile project does not appear urgent, at least if the reason for building this system is to provide protection against an increase in the SNLE's degree of vulnerability. Nor is the SX necessary in the near future as a replacement for the Albion Plateau land-based missile, which is above all a sacrosanct weapon whose nuclear destruction would, by definition, mean a nuclear response. This system, possibly modernized, would not have to be replaced, a priori, in its mission.

This leaves the third branch of the triad--strategic nuclear aircraft--which will reach a lapse by the middle of the next decade. It is not altogether

¹¹The British have "secured" Oman--which is at least as important strategically--with an economy of resources that should be an inspiration for us.

obvious that this component must be replaced in its first strategic missions: SNLE would suffice for that. However, if France and the United Kingdom decided to change from minimal deterrence to broader deterrence together, this could be an opportunity for specific cooperation on a successor system for Mirage IV aircraft.

Should a limit on financing have to be set in order to satisfy this nuclear priority, the average for the last 15 years--approximately 20 percent of the defense budget--would appear to be a reasonable ceiling.

Staying very far below that would probably make it impossible to finance programs as costly as the M.5 and SNLE-NG. Exceeding that ceiling for an extended period would undoubtedly be interpreted as a demonstration of nuclear isolationism on the part of France and would thus have political consequences contrary to the goal sought, not to mention unfavorable effects on our conventional forces.

The other priority, the requirement of solidarity, does not depend solely on us: for in order to cooperate, it takes at least two! This means a twofold action, by France on one hand and by its partners on the other. Such action, however, does not require a metamorphosis of European geopolitics: in order to move ahead, measures as radical as establishing a European executive council or eliminating certain existing institutions need not be considered. It is better to act in the context of a disorderly reality than to dream of a more harmonious but abstract arrangement.

Nuclear Cooperation

France enjoys the advantage it derives from the complete independence of its nuclear forces, whether this concerns design, production or C3 (command, control, communications). This political asset, rather than being held in reserve indefinitely, may also be weakened under certain conditions. With the United Kingdom, it would be logical to develop a pre-strategic weapons system to succeed the "Mirage aircraft/medium-range air-to-surface missiles (ASMP)" and "Tornado aircraft/gravity bombs" dyads.¹² The program for a supersonic cruise missile carried by future European combat aircraft, the Eurofighter (EAP) and the Rafale, could be technically and financially assumed by these two nations together. The mission of such a weapons system would be to reach the enemy's forces in a pre-strategic strike. It would not be necessary to seek an impossible and inappropriate merger of decision-

¹²France has 18 Mirage IV P strategic bombers and Mirage 2000 N penetration aircraft (110 planned for 1987 to 1992). These aircraft are or will be equipped with medium-range air-to-surface missiles (ASMP) carrying a nuclear warhead. The United Kingdom is in turn deploying several dozen Tornado penetration aircraft in the FRG, carrying nuclear bombs of British design and manufacture. There is a question of whether to replace such relatively old gravity bombs with limited-range missiles, more or less comparable to ASMP.

making mechanisms concerning its use. Nuclear doctrines could be reconciled, including coordination of strike plans. Under such a project, the use of U.S. nuclear technology would not necessarily be required. Thus the United Kingdom would not necessarily be shackled by the 1958 U.S.-British accords. On the other hand, cooperation on the M.5's development would probably oblige the British either to disregard those commitments (which appears neither likely nor desirable) or to obtain approval from the United States for a "third-party" extension for sharing certain data, at least in a particular instance. Other measures, more modest, such as the coordination of SNLE operational cycles or comparison of strike plans, could also be considered.

With regard to the FRG, France could submit at least two proposals, each complementary to the other. First, giving concrete shape¹³ to the statement made by the president of the republic on 28 February 1986 in order to establish between Paris and Bonn a consultation mechanism comparable to the one that exists between the FRG and its full nuclear partners (the United Kingdom and the United States) and specifically concerning possible strike plans. As in the case of decisions for using such weapons, the matter is more political than practical, since the nuclear country is, in fine, the sole master of the game. France could¹⁴ also inform the FRG that Hades pre-strategic missiles could be deployed on its soil, should the Bonn government express such a desire, which would make it possible to fire the missiles beyond East German territory. Similar action could also be taken, beginning in 1988, in the case of Mirage 2000 N aircraft equipped with medium-range air-to-surface missiles, in order to increase their range far beyond the "Iron Curtain." We should add that such measures should simply be proposed, without requiring any response, given the FRG's legitimately ambiguous position concerning any deployment of additional nuclear resources on territory that is already heavily fortified.... In this regard, it is the intention that counts.

These suggestions assume, of course, that a certain consensus exists, at least among WEU member countries¹⁵ concerning the need to avoid denuclearization of Europe. Thus it is imperative that these nations agree at least on the rejection of a third "zero option," which would affect short-range

¹³In his statement of 28 February 1986, the president of the French Republic indicated he was "willing to consult with the chancellor ... concerning the possible use of French pre-strategic weapons on German territory ... within the limitations imposed by the extreme rapidity of such decisions."

¹⁴An initial regiment should be operational in 1992/1993.

¹⁵The seven member countries of the Western European Union all support the concept of deterrence and, with the exception of Luxembourg, they all possess or are recipients of nuclear weapons.

nuclear missiles (with a range of less than 500 km).¹⁶ On the other hand, it has probably become difficult to avoid the "double zero option" for INF (missiles with a range of 1,000 to 5,000 km) and SRINF (missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 km). The zero option proposed by the Soviets for SRINF is less important than some reports assume, for it affects only an array of weapons whose number is very limited (about a dozen SS23's and several dozen SS12's). The zero option for INF, however, has been continually proposed by NATO countries since 1981 and its seed is contained in the "dual decision" made by full NATO member countries in December 1979. This "dual decision" provides that there would be no deployment of Pershing II and U.S. cruise missiles if the Soviets would get rid of their SS20's.

We should note that the nuclear cooperation measures suggested above cost nothing or, in the case of a French-British cruise missile, are affordable as long as we adhere to a doctrine rejecting a disorderly increase in the number of warheads and their vehicles. France expects to deploy several dozen Hades missiles and barely more than about 100 "double capacity" aircraft (Mirage 2000 N): few in number, these weapons hardly seem apt to be eliminated by the negotiations, except in the event the denuclearization of Europe is approved.

On the other hand, a massive increase in the number of such nuclear resources would lead France to a change in strategy that would place it in an uncertain position in relation to neighboring countries, which are supposed to benefit from it. It is, of course, permissible to recommend the production of neutron bombs (after all, these are tactical nuclear weapons like any others), but provided such large quantities are not produced that France would move from a deterrent posture to that of a nuclear "super artillery" force. The same reasoning would apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the possible decision to produce chemical weapons for retaliation, in the absence of an agreement forbidding the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Conventional Forces

Today, France would hardly be justified in "squeezing its way into a niche" in the FRG because, traditionally, France has been the only strategic reserve of SACEUR [Supreme Allied Command, Europe].¹⁷ In the event of a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe or a decline in West German forces as a result of population changes,¹⁸ this position would have to be reviewed. If the "hole" to be filled were of limited size--equal to or less than the Second Army Corps, for example, or approximately 50,000 men--and if vacant infrastructures were available, it would be difficult for France to refuse a West German request.

¹⁶Cf. the article cited in footnote 4.

¹⁷In the event of application of the Ailleret-Lemnitzer accords.

¹⁸Between now and 1994, the number of young men able to bear arms in the FRG will have declined by 49 percent (using constant selection criteria).

However, in the current situation, this "squeezing into a niche" would imply an outright return to being under full NATO command, which would not only not be acceptable to the French but would also probably not be in the full interest of our partners, considering the "Euromissiles battle."

Thus when the time comes, new formulas will have to be created to make it possible to reconcile, on the political and operational levels, the automatic nature of the commitment resulting from "squeezing into the niche" and non-membership in NATO. Without trying to answer this hypothetical question here, two courses of action may be outlined: the establishment of a French-German command in the CENTAG zone (NATO's "central" army group), which would mean a profound change in military decision-making mechanisms for both NATO and France; the elimination (at the instigation of full NATO member countries) of the Defense Planning Committee, established after France withdrew from NATO's military command.

In such a case, the North Atlantic Council, from which France has never withdrawn, would again have authority, ipso facto, over defense policy issues. The French Government would have to agree to be represented in ministerial meetings not only by the minister of foreign affairs, but also by the minister of defense. This hypothesis seems possible, since France already participates in regular meetings, at the defense ministry level, of the Independent European Programs Group and WEU, without its forces being subordinate to them....

Apart from such relatively drastic steps, which would be justified in particular by a possible change in the conditions of the U.S. presence in Europe, several measures could be taken by France:

Political affirmation, at the highest level, of the automatic engagement of our forces in the event of an attack on Europe. In a way, this would be a French version of the "Ich bin ein Berliner" statement, all the more natural since the Treaty of Brussels requires such use of our forces for the benefit of our allies. We should add that with regard to Berlin, we are well in the forefront and automatically committed should a conflict break out in that area, including the acceptance of its political consequences.

Preparation, with NATO, of contingency plans to permit vanguard commitment of the Rapid Action Force, based on the Valentin-Ferber agreements concluded in 1974 for the French First Army in the area in which it would be called on to operate.

Periodically holding large-scale French-German exercises in the northern FRG (thus outside "our" usual zone of action located in southern Germany), with the likely participation of British and Belgian forces, and preceded by maximum political mediation fanfare. Thus it would be desirable for the president of the republic and the chancellor of the FRG to witness the Rapid Action Force's initial maneuvers in Germany in September.

Increasingly involved in European defense in the FRG, French conventional forces will have to continue their modernization and keep their numbers relatively large in order to confront a threat characterized by a short alert

period. Considering these European responsibilities and the importance of maintaining cohesion between the level of force strength and the demands of conscription, desirable in itself, the minimum threshold for ground troops could be set at around 260,000 men by the mid-1990s, as opposed to 290,000 in 1988, among other years, at the expense of overseas forces and the Third Army Corps (stationed in northern France).

In view of the rising cost of materiel, the purchasing terms for the tools of defense will have to be improved and research and development expenses shared. Indeed, rationalization of military expenditures, for a medium-size power like France, lies in cooperation.

Without going into detail about a subject widely debated elsewhere, several key ideas should be supported by France, some¹⁹ of which appear in the recent GEIP "Rapport des Sages" [Report of Experts]:

1. Defense cooperation will have an even better chance of succeeding if it is preceded by technological cooperation "up the line": thus Europeans should establish the military equivalent of the ESPRIT technological research program with joint financing for common projects.
2. French military staffs should define the needs and specifications corresponding to specific features of combat in central Europe: this is not only a prerequisite for military efficiency, in a particularly demanding context, but also the only way to produce materiel jointly. Such specifications will likely lead to the production of heavier, more expensive and thus less numerous aircraft, but in this regard the French Air Force would only be following its counterparts in other central European countries. Note that with regard to exports, the reference to "European" or "NATO" has become an asset that is virtually equivalent to a national "label," judging from the success of the "Tornado" aircraft in Saudi Arabia.
3. Reducing costs and combining production efforts also mean making European defense contracts accessible to a certain degree of competition. International calls for bids should be systematically issued, initially for materiel least likely to cause political controversy (munitions, spare parts, equipment, subsystems).
4. Europe will not be able to have credible defenses if it does not have extensive resources for transmitting and gathering intelligence, i.e., observation, telecommunication and listening satellites. Such programs-- "Helios" and "Syracuse" in France, "Skynet" and "Zircon" in the United Kingdom--are very expensive and the next generation of satellites will

¹⁹"Towards a Stronger Europe," a report by an independent study team established by defense ministers of nations of the IEPG to make proposals to improve the competitiveness of Europe's defense equipment industry (February 1987).

probably be prohibitive for a medium-size power: production of a future full-time observation satellite will be possible only on the European scale.

5. The broader air defenses of the future, needed to combat new Soviet conventional aircraft and missiles (ballistic, cruise or airborne), will be effective and financially affordable only if they are also the subject of Euro-American cooperation (with U.S. troops in Europe necessarily benefiting from this, of course).

Some of these measures--it might be said--could adversely affect the French consensus on defense policy. This argument has its limits, however. First of all, the present consensus on nuclear deterrence is recent; the major political groups have only gradually endorsed it (the centrists beginning in 1969, the communists in 1977, the socialists in 1978). We should therefore not exaggerate its permanency--or even its necessity. Next, the consensus has less to do with a specific defense doctrine than with general issues: deterrence, independence, solidarity. Finally, polls demonstrate the growing importance being given to solidarity: not only are there no more taboos (apart from the FRG's--and others'--possession of nuclear weapons themselves),²⁰ but on the contrary, a very clear endorsement of more conspicuous European commitment can be noted.

Political parties have certainly understood this and, with the exception of the communist party, they have all profoundly modified their statements and platforms in recent years, including the RPR [Rally for the Republic].

Thus it is conceivable that a split in the consensus could result not from moving toward automatic commitment on the side of our European allies, but rather from the excessively slow rate of such a development. If dogmatic inhibitions bar the way toward desirable changes, it is to be feared that popular consent, which constitutes the strength of French defense policy, might then evaporate.

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²⁰Cf. the poll published in LE MONDE on 28 June 1985, in which 32 percent of those polled were of the opinion that "today West Germany should have nuclear weapons." See also the SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company]-FIGARO poll conducted from 7 to 11 April 1987 on the French and foreign policy. P.S.: an English-language version of the present article will be published in "Military Power in Europe: Essays in Memory of Jonathan Alford."

PAPANDREOU SEEN HOLDING ALL CARDS IN U.S. BASES NEGOTIATIONS

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 27 Jun 87 p 9

[Article by Spyros Karatzaferis]

[Text] They say that it is impossible to predict the thoughts of Premier Andreas Papandreou. Perhaps not even he himself can do this, since his thinking is guided by the feasible of today and tomorrow and is dissociated from the unachievable of yesterday and the day before.

But one can learn of his strategic plans if he has made them known to more than one person. Much more so if these plans have entered the channels of implementation and have been discussed around private diplomatic tables.

Something like this is happening already with the issue of the American bases, which have been formally debated about for days with the United States after the American Secretary of State George Schultz "genuflected" recently to the Greek demand and asked officially for the re-negotiating of the bases from a start-over position.

In the poker game that will be played on the issue of the bases, A. Papandreou will have against him as partners the Americans and the Greek opposition, both conservative and leftist. On the strength of his plan, which we will reveal today, he will be the winner in one way or another and will make a serious bid to be once again the victor in the elections, which by all indications will now take place in the spring of 1988.

Papandreou's plan has already been put into effect. He stated to the Americans--and briefed the expatriate Greek community (Archbishop of North America Iakovos knows something about this) that:

He will sign an agreement on having the bases remain, in order to safeguard the national interests.

The expatriate Greek community was enthusiastic about the decision of the premier on retaining the bases and found the safeguarding of national interests by way of the bases to be "very logical."

The Americans were satisfied in principle with the "ratification" while remaining cautious about the safeguarding of national interests, but they have not reacted negatively (yet) because the expatriate Greeks approved of it, and the Americans are facing elections.

When the premier talks about safeguarding the national interests he means--and is asking of the Americans:

1. Money
2. Establishing by legislation the balance of forces between Greece and Turkey--that is, at a ratio of 7 to 10.
3. Signing of a non-aggression pact with Turkey.
4. Appealing to the World Court at the Hague for a definition of the relevant continental shelf, and
5. An acceptable framework for solving the Cyprus problem.

Bingo....The Americans were displeased--not officially, because so far the talks have been unofficial--but they said:

1. We are not able to give money, because the bases serve the interests of the Alliance and the security of Greece.

B. The other four demands (terms) are intergovernmental problems between Greece and Turkey and "we cannot make an agreement to the detriment of a third party."

I am informed that this is how Papandreou's plan has evolved up to this point. But it also contains some aces in the hole, primarily with regard to the domestic players of the game--the Greek opposition.

At the critical moment, it is said, he will call on all the political leaders, will announce to them his decision and the terms for the safeguarding of the national interests, will explain to them the dangers concerning national adventures, and will state to them:

- If you all demand of me, but it must be all of you (Mitsotakis, Florakis, Kyrkos, Stefanopoulos) that the bases must leave, then I will expel them the next day, even if the Americans satisfy our terms.

What will the political leaders answer to the question of the premier, "should I proceed if they ensure us our national interests?" The same thing that the gambler says when his opponent has four aces: I pass.

If the Americans accept the framework of the Greek premier, then Andreas Papandreou will go to a referendum with the statement that:

- He is backing off for the sake of the national interest and will ask of his nollowers to vote according to their conscience. The same for the officers of

his party, some of whom will come out straightforwardly against the retention of the bases in order to satisfy the leftist voters.

And Papandreou himself can say (and will say):

- And I myself believe that the bases ought to leave, because they do not serve our national defense. But they are a part of a correlation of balances of forces that touch on all our national issues, whereupon the way is clear:

- Safeguarding of our national interests via the bases and via compromise.

Again bingo....

If the Americans do not accept the terms that safeguard our national interests, what will happen? This also is anticipated in the plan.

A. Papandreou, supported by the expatriate Greek community, will state to the Americans that "he cannot subscribe to the retention of the bases with the entire opposition and his party in disagreement (remember the question)" and will resort immediately to elections with the chief watchword being the issue of the bases.

Bingo, bingo....

He drives into a corner both the conservative and the leftist faction, transcends the many mistakes of his governing and his austerity program, and goes out on the stump with a patriotic song and then dares K. Mitsotakis to catch up with him.

Much more simply: If the Americans do not go along, he repeats the bombshell of 9 March 1985 (remember: under the presidency of K. Karamanlis), which gave him a manifest victory for the sake of "better days," which unfortunately have not yet come.

A logical question: And the Americans will not react?

And of course they will react, unless...some little bird has whispered in their ear that following the elections the signing of the agreement on the retention of the bases is assured.

As you see, all the aces are in the sleeves of A. Papandreou, and he has a fighting chance at the elections whether the Americans agree with the safeguards or not.

And I swear that this is the way things are, notwithstanding that it is tremendously difficult to swear about any plans of A. Papandreou.

Postscript. I neglected to write that come what may, two American bases will close with the concurrence of the United States. One is the Ellinikon base. As for the second, we will have to wait and see.

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ASW FORCE TAKING SUMMER VACATION

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 9 Jul 87 p 6

[Article by Anders Hellberg: "Submarine Force On July Vacation"]

[Text] The Navy has no part of the submarine force ready for action in July, even if we get more indications of foreign submarines in Tore in Norrbotten.

"I have recommended to the supreme commander to have the whole force assembled during a large part of the summer and therefore completely free for a shorter time," Naval Commander-in-Chief Vice-Admiral Bengt Schuback said to SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

Schuback's opinion is that the country's only submarine chasing force can only be used when it is completely assembled. Therefore the personnel are completely free in July so that they can be in service in June and August.

"But if we have to call people in from vacation, we will do so," Schuback said.

If more naval units are needed in Torefjarden in July, besides the only guard boat there, there are three possibilities:

"We can call in individual emergency vessels from the coastal fleet," H.G. Wessberg, chief of the defense Staff's information section, said.

"There are also local units that can be used, and naturally we can also recall personnel from vacation if there are sufficiently strong indications."

The "individual emergency vessels" are patrol boats from Galo in Stockholm's archipelago, but they require 36 hours to reach the Norrbotten coast. The local units are already in place -- that is, the famous patrol boat 76, which is the only one along the whole coast of Norrland.

At Least 24 Hours

It takes at least 24 hours to call people in from vacation, for they are allowed that much time to report for duty.

"The only way to do anything with this is for us to get two submarine chasing units," Anders Timdahl of the naval staff said. "Then one could be on duty while the other is free."

But in a submarine chasing force -- as the naval commander-in-chief has described it -- there are six coastal corvettes, six patrol boats, three mine-removing vessels, three submarines, six helicopters, and two aircraft, besides minesweepers and Coast Artillery units.

Today another four coastal corvettes are ordered, besides the two in service. In 1991 the sixth will be delivered, but then another six coastal corvettes at 300 million kronor each will be needed to get another submarine chasing force.

Is that realistic, Bengt Schuback?

"Yes, I think so," the commander-in-chief said. "I have tried to bring it up, but no one has wanted to listen to me. But I think we will gradually get 12. We will need them."

9124

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NAVAL COMMANDER ON POLITICAL, MILITARY ASPECTS OF ASW

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 15 Jul 87 p 3

[Commentary by Hans von Hofsten: "Tell Whole Truth About Incursions"]

[Text] Hans von Hofsten is a naval commander. Previous contributions: Bengt Gustafsson 1/7, Carl Bildt 2/7, and Olle Westberg 8/7.

Misunderstanding is the most commonly occurring form of understanding, my cynical neighbor says. And much of the heated debate about defense information policy on the submarine question, which is now taking place in more or less poisonous forms, is based on misunderstanding, or at any rate on false premisses.

Without myself having access to the defense staff's red-stamped actions, I dare say unhesitatingly that one now has a very clear picture of the extent and character of the submarine incursions. The data bank probably also indicates that the incursions are continuing. It would be unreasonable to think that the Defense Department did not have a rather detailed account of this picture. With this, the supreme commander has clearly done his duty within the government apparatus.

Dilemma for Supreme Commander

in addition, the general public is, according to Swedish public policy, to be kept informed by the government office in whose bailiwick important things happen. This brings the supreme commander into a dilemma.

First, he wants to give the public a clear picture of what is happening, worded so that it can easily be understood by everyone.

Second, he must avoid revealing important tactical information to the intruder and pointing out a definite nation if there is no legally binding proof.

If the supreme commander were to give the public a complete picture of what has happened during a quarter, he would probably have to present a set of tables on some A4 pages, together with extensive explanations and footnotes. The general public would then have a difficult time finding the essential elements in it, while the intruder would learn where he had been successful

and where he must be careful.

The supreme commander has therefore obviously chosen to express himself in summary and verbally. The language he uses in this must be so general that he really can stand by what he has said.

Not Strange

It is not so strange that people with different educational levels and with differing degrees of practice in reading government language interpret the significance of his words differently. From this, quite clearly, a great deal of confusion follows, not to say bewilderment, about what has actually happened. Particularly if one makes the mistake of trying to understand the character of the incursions from the events in one or a small number of them.

But it is hard to refute the necessity for a more straightforward expression and for something more informative than what has been given up to now.

Meanwhile it is also true that a quarterly report cannot give the whole truth. The events in one quarter must be put in the next quarter, a year's events in the next year, and in fact, a decade in the next decade. The result of an analysis of what has happened ever since the 1960's gives a completely different weight to the conclusions that can be drawn. The significance of these conclusions must have been such that it left the supreme commander's area of responsibility long ago. The significance affects the judgement on Sweden's whole security policy situation. To inform the public about this can only be incumbent on the government.

But the government remains silent. When it feels pressured to say something, we hear that it is taking the problem very seriously. But nothing more. Nor does it do anything honest about it. And with this my reasoning has come to the point of what I see to be the real reason for the heated press debate on defense information policy.

Those At The Front

And there are others who receive the information that is made public -- the sailors at the front. They are carrying on an activity that both as far as stress and secrecy are concerned forms a direct parallel to defense in general. No one, no matter what his rank, knows more than "what is absolutely necessary for his duty."

Of course no measures can prevent the submarine chasing personnel from making observations in the sub chases they themselves take part in, and in remembering them. Moreover, their job skills help them to understand the significance of fragments of reports they pick up from other operations and events, and to put them together. The result is that those who have been on one action have a very good idea of what happens generally. Thus it has certainly always been in all military forces.

The government, the defense leadership, and the public have the right to request, even demand, that insights into secret situations gained in this way

are not spread by personnel. This is a prerequisite for progress in one's own profession, and the temptation to violate this demand is normally small.

Trade Upon Loyalty

But everything has its limits. After my controversy with Prime Minister Palme in November 1985, I warned against trading upon the loyalty of personnel. Then as now the government has chosen to withhold from the public both the extent and the threatening character of the submarine incursions. Therefore the picture gained by the active personnel is markedly different from the official version.

The personnel would certainly tolerate this, even for a long time, if it knew that the government was trying to solve the problem with the submarines. But the government is not doing this, either.

The appropriation for submarine chasing is considered by the Navy as to be the absolute minimum the Riksdag can get by with and soothe the concerns of an unwitting public. The amount is so small that the resources we need today may possibly be available in the next millennium.

Went To The Press

This unwillingness among the government authorities to propose resources seems to the personnel like a direct reflection of the government's almost total lack of interest in defense policy questions. I cannot remember in my 35 years in the fleet hearing or seeing the country's prime minister make more than one single visit to a military unit since Erlander's time. (But the rumor is that Olof Palme was at some places in the greatest secrecy when there was a submarine chase.)

Defense Minister Roine Carlsson has in spite of diligent visits not said or done anything unusual in connection with the defense resolution, which was to give defense personnel hope that the government authorities would finally do their part of the job to solve the submarine problem.

This disparity, accumulated for many years, has finally caused the safety valve to let loose a bit among an increasing number of officers. In the lack of other possibilities, one has gone to the press. The press has then become aware of the, to put it as mildly as possible, incomplete information that is given by the authorities as a whole.

The press has reacted by criticizing the supreme commander. In my opinion this is to shoot at the wrong man, for it should be incumbent upon the government to see that the nation as a whole receives a true conception of the security policy situation.

In speeches and writings to the public the supreme commander must be completely loyal to the country's elected government. If he cannot do this, he must leave, and it is by no means sure that this solution would gain the respect of the surrounding world for Sweden.

Criticism should therefore be directed against the proper target -- the government. If it does nothing radical to bring about agreement between the information about the current threat and the reality as we know it, the debate may have an unravelling that no Swede wants.

ARMED FORCES CONCERNED PROPOSED LAW WOULD AGE OFFICER CORPS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 15 Jul 87 p 6

[Article by Anders Falkirk: "Sweden's Officer Corps Fears Aging"]

[Text] The National Employment Office's proposal to raise the retirement age to 65 for all officers can create problems for defense. Among other things, it can lead to an aging of the officer corps.

According to Colonel Bernt Osth, head of the defense staff's personnel section, it would be impossible according to the present salary budget for defense to recruit new, young officer material if at the same time one is forced to pay salaries to older officers for five more years.

"First we will get more older officers and then we would have no money to recruit new ones. And without these new officers, the average age will increase even more. The result will therefore be a double aging," Bernt Osth said.

Common Retirement Age

Since the present agreement negotiations in the government area began about a year ago, the Employment Office has tried to achieve a common retirement age for all government employees.

The reason is that the Employment Office wants to save money to be able to pay the higher pensions demanded by the unions.

Today almost a third of the government employees retire before they are 65. For example, Televerket's operators are retired at 55, customs assistants at 60, office workers between 63 and 65, and so forth. These early pensions cost the government hundreds of millions of kronor, and according to the Employment Office, it is not possible to both raise pensions for government employees and retain their advantageous retirement age. In other words, high pensions must be paid for with high retirement age.

Among the 200,000 government employees there are 17,000 career officers. They are risking having their retirement age raised for the second time since the beginning of the 1970's, from 50 in 1971 to the present 60 to the Employment

Office's suggestion of 65.

Aging

On the defense staff the responsible people are more worried about what another increase in retirement age will mean for the defense organization, and primarily the worry is about the aging of the officer corps.

At present there is already a shortage of young officers because of the officer flight to higher salaries in the private sector that began in the middle of the 1980's. In a few years the three defense branches lost almost 3,000 officers in the most attractive ages (30-40).

In order to close the gaps after this, defense is now trying to recruit officer material it can later train as officers. At present, about 850 officer recruits are brought in each year, and all must be paid salaries.

500 Elderly Per Year

But according to a rough estimate an increased retirement age would mean that the defense forces would get about 500 older officers each year for the next five years, and they must all have salaries.

"We cannot afford to pay their salaries and recruit new officers. It is an impossibility," Osth said.

Another result of an increased retirement age is that defense would be forced to create meaningful tasks and new combat assignments for officers over 60.

Desk Work

Today there are not enough desk jobs in defense's peace organization, and in the defense forces one hesitates to give 60-year-old officers physically demanding training duty.

"When we receive visits from foreign military personnel they raise an astonished eyebrow when they see 50-year-olds on training duty, but now we will get even more to create work for," Osth said.

Exceptions

The Government Employment Office has not take a position on the problems facing the defense forces if the retirement age is raised to 65, but it can imagine exceptions to the general raise.

"If the defense forces can show, for example, that the physical strain of work would be too great for older officers, then we can imagine some negotiation on the matter," Peter Stahre, head negotiator for the Employment Office, said.

9124

CSO: 3650/182

DEFENSE INDUSTRY FUND TARGETS PRIVATE SECTOR BUSINESS

Istanbul DUNYA (Supplement) in Turkish 23 Mar 87 pp 1, 3

[Text] Vahit Erdem, head of the Defense Industry Development and Support Agency (DIDSA), expressing his wish to see private sector active in defense industry, also stated his intention to increase domestic industry's share from the Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF). Erdem noted that they have asked for bids from 5 foreign firms for the low-flying air defense system project, and 3 foreign firms have submitted offers for production of armored carriers. The bids are in the process of being evaluated. So far as the armored carrier project is concerned the evaluation has reached final stage and the results could be expected within a few days or a month.

The legislation establishing DIDSA (as published in The Official Gazette 13 November 1985) has given the Agency the mandate, "developing a modern defense industry and modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces." DISF has reached TL 250 billion in a short period making defense industry an attractive proposition for both foreign and domestic investors. In the first stage, the Agency tendered two projects that had been transferred over from the Defense Ministry--'Low-flying Air Defense Systems' and 'Armored Carriers Production'. DIDSA asked for bids from foreign firms with the proviso that they find domestic partners. These two projects created quite a stir in the international defense market. The race was on for foreign firms to find Turkish partners and domestic firms to strike partnerships with foreign firms. Referring to the projects, Erdem, head of DIDSA, said:

We have not asked for direct bids from domestic firms. We stipulated that foreign firms establish joint ventures with domestic firms. These projects require advanced technology, covering many sectors ranging from the automotive to electronics. Our capacity

in these areas is limited. We want to restructure our industry in such a way as to make defense industry possible in our country.

Erdem said they wanted to see the private sector in this area. The priority would be given to projects in electronics. He talked to DUNYA about the objectives of DISF and other related developments:

As you know, the government's objective in establishing the Fund (DISF) has been to ensure that some of the modern armaments needed by our army are domestically produced but with the benefit of foreign knowhow. In this way the army's burden on the economy would be lessened. The Agency has been charged with the multiple task of restructuring our existing industry to accomodate the needs of the defense industry, encouraging new initiatives and channelling them towards the restructuring effort, looking for ways to facilitate the input of foreign capital and technology, offering guidance to new ventures, regulating state participation, planning the production of modern arms, vehicles and equipment by private or public corporations, supporting new investment projects provided they are open to foreign participation, coordinating the exchanges between domestic and foreign companies, issuing and receiving credits, setting up joint ventures and so on. To carry out these tasks the Agency has initiated a two-pronged effort--setting up new and modern defense industry while restructuring existing industry to a level of sophistication where it can cater to the needs of that industry.

Erdem also said that "a sound assessment of Turkish Army's needs and getting a good fit between annual procurement programs and domestic industry will be a spur to domestic industrial activity." Responding to criticism that no concrete results are apparent since the inception of the Agency, Erdem said:

We have been in operation for a year. During that time we have completed the initial organization, set up our core personnel, and got the technical studies started. And we had a number of projects transferred to us from the Defense Ministry. We took up one of these, the Armored Carrier Project, quite swiftly. That is due to the fact that we have an established automotive industry in Turkey. In designing the project, consideration was given to the integration aspect--that is, integrating with Turkish industry. The model had been already selected by the Defense Ministry. We prepared a detailed dossier and sent it to Krauss--Maffei AG (Federal Germany), GKN Sankey (Britain) and FMS (U.S.). We are studying their proposals and have reached the decision stage.

With regard to 'Low-Flying Air Defense Systems', Erdem had this to say:

We have invited offers from Oerlikon-Buhre (Switzerland), Ford Aerospace and Communication (U.S.), Contraves AG (Switzerland), Euromissile (France), and British Aerospace (Britain). We are working on that project as well. The decisions might have come earlier for both projects but we are still new to the game. We are still grappling with the problems of organization. The armored carrier project is at the decision stage. The results can be announced a few days or within a month, certainly no later than the middle of the year.

Erdem pointed out that the function of the Agency was to offer purchase guarantees for the vehicles and systems to be produced, issuing credits and advances. He reiterated the point that they would like to see the private sector get into the act. TL 250 billion had accumulated in DISF, the only credit that had been issued to date was for a MKE project, and DIDSa had joined the F-16 project as a partner.

What Is the Defense Industry Support Fund?

As published in the 13 November 1985 issue of the official gazette, Law No 3238 has authorized the formation of the Defense Industry Development and Support Agency (DIDSa) with a view to "developing a modern defense industry and modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces." And a Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF) was established under the authority of DIDSa. The Fund has access to revenues from a variety of sources: Budget appropriations, duties on alcohol and tobacco products, funds to be transferred from the Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces, revenues from the National Lottery and other betting agencies, revenues from the designated fuel consumption tax and other revenues taxed at that rate (salary and wage income excepted), revenues from gaming establishments, revenues from monetary exemption from military service, and donations.

The legislation authorizes expenditure of the funds for purposes such as: Production of modern arms, vehicles and equipment; their procurement from domestic and external sources, establishment of defense-related production units by public or private sector utilizing foreign capital and technology. The guidelines for these expenditures will be set by Defense Industry Executive Committee (DIEC) chaired by the prime minister, made up of the chief of General Staff and the defense minister. The wording of the legislation suggests that the Fund is likely to engage in

activities such as making purchases from domestic and external sources, issuing credits, setting up ventures with domestic and foreign capital and/or joining them as partners.

The Cabinet has decided to set the special tax on fuel consumption as 3 percent while the tax on gross revenues of gaming establishments will be 30 percent. Those eligible for (professional) income tax and corporation tax will have to pay a further 3 percent towards the Fund.

12466

CSO:3554/228

MISSILE FIRM ANTICIPATES EXPORTS

Istanbul DUNYA (Supplement) in Turkish 23 Mar 87 p 2

[Text] Emek Holding has the distinction of being the first private sector firm producing armaments for Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). One of its subsidiaries, Baris Electrical Industry, has been using reinforced fiber or customized resin as isolating material to be applied in electrical machinery--e.g. isolators, transformers. Having won the MKE tender, the company is now using the material in the production of 'Law Launcher,' an anti-tank weapon. The weapon, together with its missile, weighs 2.2 kg and is disposable. Its missiles are produced by MKE.

Producing 2,000 units a month, Emek Holding is near the completion of its 15,000-unit order. Having gained experience on the job the company is now venturing into tank modernization, trying to prove that 'thermal jackets' used for protecting tank turrets could be made in Turkey. The 'jacket' has passed the technical tests by the TAF.

Having won the TL 300 million Law Launcher Tender, Emek has expended TL 200 million so far. The company is said to have received orders from Pakistan and Taiwan. The Pakistani order involves tank modernization, while Taiwan is interested in the outside shell of the Law Launcher.

Retired General Hamdi Kizginkaya, technical consultant to the firm, says there are quite a lot of things private sector can do in the field of defense industry:

We shouldn't exaggerate the challenge. The private sector is perfectly capable of meeting 60-70 percent of the needs of TAF. But organization is deficient. If organization can be remedied external dependence will be reduced. But for that we need a comprehensive inventory of Turkish industry--i.e. which industry can do what for meeting our defense needs.

Kizginkaya noted that Emek Holding was operating with that kind of understanding. The private sector should not be awed by the task at hand. He went on to say:

The private sector should not feel overwhelmed by the challenge of defense industry. Everyone should be thinking in terms of how he can be of help to the Armed Forces. With such an attitude everyone can find something to produce that can be of use to the TAF. But that would require a well-developed organization.

Meanwhile, Emek Holding has filed an application to the Defense Ministry for arms production. If approved, it will extend its production lines into other areas.

The reinforced fiber and customized resin used in the production of Law Launcher has many other military and civilian uses. In the military field, it is used in airplanes, helicopters, light boats, land vehicles (body and superstructure). In the defense industry it is used in rockets, torpedo shells, rocket-launchers and their engines, artillery turrets, backfire systems, thermal jackets, all kinds of missiles and their casings (aircraft missiles included). It is used in military construction materials, portable bridges, storage facilities and command centers, watch-towers and other pre-fab structures, portable tents and other portable equipment, support structures (replacing steel pipes). On the civilian side it is used in piping installations, storage facilities, aircrafts, boats, cars, home furniture, construction materials, sports equipment.

12466

CSO: 3554/228

BUSINESSMAN DESCRIBES STATUS OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Istanbul DUNYA (Supplement) in Turkish 23 Mar 87 p 4

[Text] Ali Nizamoglu, general coordinator of Ercan Holding, noting that a good deal of ground has been covered in the area of defense industry maintains that the system is now in place. Reminding that the government had made its policy quite clear on the subject, Nizamoglu reiterated the point that needs of the Turkish Army could be served by our domestic industry. He went on to say:

To that end, the Defense Industry Fund has been established. And, true to Western practice no distinction has been made between private and public sectors. That has brought a new dynamism to the fore. The government has conceived this industry to be export-oriented and geared to foreign currency inflow. These are important steps. No other government has adopted these positions so unambiguously.

After the initial stages the F-16 project was taken up and a good deal of ground was covered in that. DIDSA (Defense Industry Development and Support Agency) was given the task of completing 3 projects to start with. The Agency took its duties seriously and determined the selection criteria. These projects were: Air defense radar systems, procurement of ground-launched missiles, and light armored vehicles. These priority projects are expected to be finalized in 1987. Other projects will be taken up in accordance with their place in the priority scale.

Defense industry is not a simple matter. Particularly when exports are viewed as an integral element. A good deal of ground has been covered in this area and the system can now be said to be in place. There are minor aspects which present problems mostly arising out of bureaucratic procedures. But they are not serious enough to make an impact on substance, merely cause delays.

A point that needs to be emphasized at this stage is this: In Turkey, industry has reached a certain level. Similarly, the pool of qualified personnel has reached significant levels. Now that the infrastructure is in place it is possible for Turkey to make great strides in this area. If future governments stick to a consistent policy Turkey would be in a position to meet its own defense needs as well as exporting its products.

Detailing Ercan Holding's activities in defense industry, Nizamoglu went on to say:

We are cooperating with Krauss-Maffei of Germany in the light armored vehicles project. This is a priority need so far as Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) are concerned. TAF needs 3,000 light armored vehicles in the next 10 years, 300 annually. It wants to procure them from domestic sources. DIDSAs has been given this task. Defense Ministry had already talked to world-class producers of the vehicle, subjecting them to a preliminary screening. Following from that DIDSAs asked for bids from Krauss-Maffei (with whom we are collaborating), the American firm FMC and the British GKN. These firms, having established working relations with Turkish firms, presented their bids on 31 October 1986. The evaluation is still continuing. We are expecting the results by the end of this month.

Having signed a protocol with Krauss-Maffei, we presented our joint bid. Our initial cost estimates were DM 200 million, starting from scratch. Given that high figure, we had to take a number of things into consideration: That we should try to make use of investments already in place, and if we are to invest in Turkey we might as well venture into new fields. In this way inutile capacity would be reactivated and foreign currency savings would be made. So if we could make use of existing installations we might be able to produce these vehicles in Turkey with an outlay of DM 40 million. If our bid is accepted we will be engaging in a joint venture. In the newly-established company Krauss-Maffei will have a 34 percent share. The rest will be distributed among domestic partners, with a good percentage remaining with us. The engine will come from MAN Motors, thus it will be 100 percent domestically produced. Other parts will come from MKE and Tekfen, and from our own plants. We intend to make use of the Pendik Shipyard installations, thus making use of inutile capacity.

12466

CSO: 3554/228

ROCKET LAUNCHER PARL-70 TO BEGIN PRODUCTION

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 25 Mar 87 p 7

[Text] MES, the private firm that manufactured the first Turkish rocket-launcher using 100 percent domestic technology, is awaiting a 'command' to start up large-scale production. Sevki Duzyol, chairman of the MES board (Mechanical Electrical Chemical Industry Inc.), said they were proud having proven that domestic production in arms industry can succeed, and that they have been able to provide the Turkish army with a rocket-launcher. "If we can get the orders we would be able to produce better models," he said. Noting that they could sell PARL-70 multiple-fire rocket-launcher to the Turkish army at TL30 million apiece, Duzyol said:

"Our profits from this production line will be minimal. The same type of rocket-launcher cannot be imported from abroad for less than TL 100 million. Our launchers can hit targets within an 8,000-meter range. There are launchers with a 30-50,000-meter range. We have been able to do this much with what we have. If we are given the chance we could do much better. Our army's request would be considered a command. But if we cannot get enough orders we will have to abandon the whole project.

Duzyol stated that they started producing the rocket-launcher at the request of the Ground Forces Technical Department, without receiving a penny. He added: "We got invaluable help from MKE. In any case MKE is our daily bread. With their further support we could achieve much more."

Evren Pleased

The trials of the first Turkish rocket-launcher manufactured by MES took place on 2 March. They were attended by President Kenan Evren who expressed his appreciation to those responsible.

CENTRAL BANK PROGNOSIS: INCREASED CAPITAL INVESTMENT

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 23 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial by Hakan Nylund; first paragraph is HUFVUDSTADSBLADET introduction]

[Text] According to a survey made by the Bank of Finland, there will be a substantial increase in industrial investments this year. Greater investment is a welcome growth stimulus in our consumption-fueled economy, enabling growth to remain stable, at least this year, in Hakan Nylund's opinion.

Economic growth has long been determined by demand for material and immaterial necessities. National economists divide demand into three main groups: consumption, exports and investment. In recent years growth has clearly been fuelled by consumption, which rose because Finns had more buying power, and to an increasing extent by exports. When it came to investment developments, on the other hand, there has been greater uncertainty in economic forecasts, as it was feared that the business sector would curb investments as a result of the high interest level, an opinion that has been expressed in public.

However the Bank of Finland's latest survey, like a similar one made 6 months ago, shows a different and encouraging trend. In the bank's opinion industrial investments will rise by as much as 15 percent this year, a figure that is clearly higher than the figures various forecasters used as a basis for their predictions.

The survey shows that manufacturing industries are the major force behind investments this year, while industries like electric plants, waterworks and mines are cutting back on investments. According to the responses to the survey, manufacturing industries plan to increase investment by as much as 19 percent this year, but as experience has shown that the timetable for implementing investment plans is often too optimistic, the estimates have been adjusted downward.

Within the manufacturing sector, chemical wood processing industries and chemical industries were the ones that expected to make heavy investments. This is no surprise, because these are heavy, capital-intensive branches and for this reason projects are announced well in advance and receive a lot of

publicity. However one of the heavy industries, metal, anticipates an investment increase of only 1 percent.

Investments are expected to rise at the same rate in both large and small companies. Investments by state firms are still growing at a faster rate than those of private firms, but the difference between the two groups continues to shrink.

The much-discussed structural changes can be seen from the fact that fixed investments are going to machinery and equipment to a large extent, while industrial construction investments are expected to decline. In other words fewer new factories are being built today, but existing buildings are being renovated and made more efficient. "Flexible" investments in research and product development are also increasing and according to the survey they should rise to around 3 billion marks, which is approximately 18 percent of the level of fixed investments. The survey does not take other flexible investments, such as market investments, into account.

The investment rate of Finnish industries, e.g. investments in relation to added value, is high on an international scale. The fixed investment level is 20 percent and if investments in research and development are included, the figure rises to around 24 percent. With regard to fixed investments, our investment rate is clearly higher than it is in competitive countries such as Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is true that the industrial investment rate is not as high as it was in the peak years of the 1970's, but the economic situation and the industrial development level are different today and the predicted rate--if it is implemented--will clearly be a peak for the 1980's. Thus the generally declining investment level in relation to gross national product can mainly be attributed to the decline in housing and infrastructure investments, where a natural saturation point was reached in many sectors.

A high investment rate increases demand and speeds up the economy and often also has a greater long-term effect than consumer demand. But there is reason to bear in mind that investment needs for special machinery and equipment are met through imports to a large extent. Thus strong investment tends to weaken the trade balance and the trend is intensified by the fact that business investments abroad are rising. Last year direct industrial investments abroad added up to around 2 billion marks, approximately 2 percent of added value. Increased investments in Finland and abroad are a positive development, but only as long as they lead to increased income in the future.

Therefore our high industrial investment rate compared to industries in competitive countries should not be assigned too high an intrinsic value either, but should lead to critical questions about why our industries have to invest more than industries in other countries. Part of the explanation is that we have a larger proportion of capital-intensive industries than they do in other countries, due in part to our large wood processing sector. But Sweden, which has an industrial structure quite similar to

Finland's, gets along with a lower investment rate. Since the average Swedish industry is more capital-intensive per job than ours, the most likely explanation is that added value and indirect efficiency are higher there.

Against this background the high interest level has not necessarily been a bad thing. The high interest rate has forced businesses to consider yield on investment more carefully and to be more efficient in allocating resources. The reverse side of the efficiency coin, however, is our firms' very great dependence on borrowed capital, which cannot be altered quickly. Structural change is painful and this explains the constant complaints about interest levels.

Six months ago, when the last survey was published, dissatisfaction with the interest level led to skepticism and open criticism of its results, which many people considered contrary to realistic perceptions. This time the criticism has been milder. One reason is undoubtedly that actual developments and market prospects are relatively good just now, another is that since last summer businesses have again had relatively free access to cheap foreign credit.

The results of the Bank of Finland's investment survey undoubtedly strengthen confidence in the more optimistic economic forecasts for this year, in spite of warning signals in the international economy. But for 1988, when an international recession could begin to be felt in earnest, the survey unfortunately predicts declining investments.

6578

CSO: 3650/178

BRIEFS

FINNISH-SOVIET DATA BANK AGREEMENT--(FNB)--Kotkan Tietotekniikkakeskus Oy has signed an agreement with a Soviet foreign trade firm concerning the formation of two data banks for trade between Finland and the Soviet Union. The parties to the agreement set up a data bank in Finland with information on Soviet export products and Soviet foreign trade organizations. The data bank in the Soviet Union will contain similar information about interested Finnish export firms and their products. The data banks will use Soviet computers and Finnish programs. The data banks will start serving customers as early as this summer. The system is expected to be complete by the end of the year. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 22 Jun 87 p 4] 6578

CSO: 3650/178

SIGNIFICANT LOSSES REPORTED IN MERCHANT MARINE FLEET

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 7 Jul 87 p 16

[Excerpt] The strength of the Greek merchant marine fleet, as well as the mercantile exchange it brings to the country, has been reduced by 50 percent since 1981. This disturbing fact, which proves the failure of PASOK's policy that deprived the Greek economy of valuable exchange resources, was published in the world renown LLOYD'S REVIEW, a British maritime publication.

But what is most important is the publication's assessment that the rapid shrinkage of Greece's merchant fleet does not appear to be slowing down despite measures the government adopted last November. LLOYD'S indisputable data reveal that:

--The number of merchant ships flying the Greek flag has been reduced by about 50 percent from 3,920 to 2,091 ships.

--The total capacity of our merchant fleet dropped by 50 percent from 42.7 million tons to 23.8 percent.

--The mercantile exchange was reduced from 1,821 million dollars in 1981 to 995 million dollars in 1986 or by 50 percent.

However, the most dramatic warning comes from the fact that measures the government adopted for improving competitiveness of Greek ships have thus far been in vain. In the 6-month period since the end of November, when the measures were taken, our fleet's capacity dropped by 2 million tons or by 10 percent.

7520

CSO: 3521/152

FORECASTS FOR FUTURE OF GNP REPORTED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Jul 87 p 1

[Text] The gap separating Greece from other EEC countries increased, i.e., we are becoming poorer than our partners.

In 1981, the Gross National Product (AEP), on the basis of prices and current purchasing power, was 59.9 units. It is estimated that in 1987 it will drop to 53.8 units and in 1988 to 52.7 units [European Monetary Units].

The above information is included in the European Commission report on the Community's economic status and more particularly on developments of the Greek economy.

According to an Athens News Agency report from Brussels, the Commission warns that it is necessary "to maintain strict discipline as concerns consumption and public investments, a new reduction in subsidies, cancellation of deficits of public enterprises and special regulations to terminate the trend toward increasing deficits of the pension funds."

The Commission points out that the stabilization policy the government adopted in October 1985 should be continued through 1988 as well because, despite special budget revenues, the fixed target for 1987 will not be approached.

On the basis of revised statistical tables the Commission issued in Greece:

--The increase in the need for financing the Public Administration from -9.4 percent of the AEP in 1987 will reach 10.3 percent in 1988.

--Investments will reach from +18.1 percent of the AEP in 1987 to +18.2 percent in 1988.

--The increase in the gross Public Administration debt will reach from +59.3 percent of the AEP in 1987 to 65 percent in 1988.

--Domestic demand will improve from -1.4 percent in 1987 to -0.1 percent in 1988.

--Inflation will drop to 9 percent in 1988 from 13.5 percent in 1987.

--Indirect taxes from 6.6 percent of the AEP in 1987 will reach 6.3 percent in 1988.

Finally, in 1986, Greece's financing by various EEC funds reached 598 EMU's (Social Fund, Agricultural Fund, Orientation Section). Also in 1986, Greece received 253.2 million EMU's from other EEC financing agencies (European Investments Bank, NIC, EURATOM, EKAX).

Greece collected a total of 851.2 EMU's, an amount which, according to the Commission's estimates, corresponds to 2.1 percent of the Greek AEP--the highest, together with that of Portugal, among the 12 EEC members.

7520

CSO: 3521/152

CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN ISLAMIC CULTURAL CENTER EXAMINED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 24 Mar 87 p 2

[Commentary by Tevfik Gungor]

[Text] The dictionary gives the meaning of "rabita as "connection." What can the connection be, I wonder, between the State Planning Organization (SPO) and the Islamic Countries Economic Cooperation Department?

There are good reasons for the question to be posed. According to the 21 March 1988 issue of CUMHURİYET, the Islamic Countries Economic Cooperation Department (ICECD) of the SPO, has sent a letter to the Rector of METU which starts like this: "Based upon the decision taken at the 10th General Meeting of the World Supreme Council of Mosques, convened in Mecca, which has issued instructions regarding the building of mosques at METU and the University of Ankara, provision of support for Islamic education in schools, and dissemination of the system of Koran training (as observed by the general secretary during his visit to Turkey) to other Islamic countries." The letter goes on:

"Discussions with officials of the World Islamic Union have indicated that aid would be forthcoming from that body towards financing the building of an Islamic cultural center METU grounds. Concerning this matter, enclosed is a translated copy of the relevant decision of the 10th General Meeting of the World Supreme Council of Mosques, sent along with the letter of the Office of Religious Affairs (dated 1 May 1987, No 689). Additional help will be provided by the Association for Building and Maintaining METU Mosque and Islamic Center, the Religion Foundation, as well as the assured cooperation of SPO. Therefore there is no need to worry about the financial aspect. The Islamic Cultural Center project will be affixed to the "replacement of the laboratory equipment" project to be presented to the Islamic Development Bank

The letter is signed by SPO Assistant Undersecretary Dr Imdat Akmermer.

The law establishing the SPO (dated 30 September 1960, No 91) specifies the function of the organization as follows:

- a. Determining the natural, human and economic resources of the country and aiding the government in deciding economic, social policies and targets,
- b. Helping secure coordination among various ministries with regard to economic policy,
- c. Preparing short- and long-term plans to realize the targets approved by the government,
- d. Making recommendations regarding improvements in the running of departments, organizations and local administrations to ensure the successful implementation of the plans,
- e. Monitoring and evaluating the plan and making the required revisions,
- f. Recommending measures encouraging and regulating the activities of the private sector in line with the targets and objectives of the plan.

The organizational chart of the SPO, according to Clause 6 of its charter, indicates that the central office is comprised of the following units:

1. Economic Planning Department
2. Social Planning Department
3. Coordination Department

As seen here, the SPO charter does not refer to anything called the 'Islamic Countries Economic Cooperation Department'.

It is legitimate for a government to attach more importance to relations with this or that country in line with the beliefs, views and policies of the governing party. A government can adopt different approaches to the question of religion. It can even combine affairs of state with religion, commerce with religion, or banking with religion. These are matters of political preference. But when such political preferences begin to have the effect of destroying fundamental institutions thought to be under constitutional guarantee then such "connections" (rabitas) become troublesome.

When the SPO, instead of doing the things outlined in its charter, starts assuming the functions of an organization responsible for religious affairs, engages in relations having to do with religion, such "connections" start shaking the foundations of the state and the organization is put in a position where it becomes responsible for the lack of planning and programming in economic and social development, where saving the day becomes the norm.

COMMENTARY SEES ALL ASPECTS OF RELIGIOUS ISSUE AS WHOLE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 24 Mar 87 p 3

[Commentary by Ali Sirmen]

[Text] According to some reports certain grumpy people living in elite sections of Ankara are not sleeping well due to their alleged involvement in "Rabitagate." In their nightmares they are said to have visions of Ugur Mumcu coming after their tail. I do not know how true the reports are, but with the recent METU affair, Rabitagate is gaining so many new dimensions that it should not surprise us to hear that those involved in the incident are seeing Mumcu, who unearthed the whole affair, as some sort of a ghost.

The METU (Middle East Technical University) affair is important not only because of the uncovered documents bearing signatures of those who had earlier denied involvement (Rector Gonlubol, for instance) but also because of the impression that no stone is being left unturned in this case. It is also notable that those involved in the affair are trying to put a distance between this and other instances, as well as trying to personalize the issue.

The announcement from Chankaya has indicated that Mr Evren sees CUMHURIYET's reportage on Rabitagate as a piece of good journalism (it should be considered a preliminary announcement). It is pleasing to see CUMHURIYET's efforts being seen in this light. Named by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk personally, CUMHURIYET (Republic) has indeed adopted as its goal the protection and preservation of the principles and gains of the Republic. At time when the principle of secularism, therefore the Republic itself, is under serious threat CUMHURIYET has been doing its share and is proud of its record.

The intense scrutiny of the Rabitagate affair has been good for the future of the regime as well. And all our colleagues who have taken part in the unearthing of the affair have done a great service to our democracy which is in fragile health in the best of times.

However, at a time when all who are on the side of democracy, republican principles and being contemporary, including the 'vigorous forces' whether they are civilian or not, are highly sensitive about the issue, a point should not be allowed to escape from view. The significance of Rabitagate is not only in the sub-contracting of state functions to an organization run by another state, which is incredulous enough, but beyond that. Because Rabitagate is part and parcel of efforts to place dynamite sticks at the foundations of secularism which is the fundamental principle of the Republic and its sine qua non. If Rabitagate is viewed outside this context, or taken to be detective story, it would lead to misleading conclusions. Similarly, leaving aside all the instigators of anti-secular efforts and confining ourselves only to those involved in Rabitagate, would hinder our grasping of the true dimensions of the threat aimed at the foundations of the Republic.

Yes, Rabitagate cannot be abstracted from the abolition of the Turkish Language Council, the Turkish Historical Council and replacing them with the Ataturk Supreme Council (ASC). We must not forget that ASC has taken decisions toward establishing 'Turkish-Islam synthesis' as official state ideology. And those decisions bear the signatures of people at the very top. All these collaborative efforts, as in compulsory religion courses in schools, are part of an orientation towards a certain type of regime, a certain worldview. Looking at developments in this broader context, it can readily be understood that asking for 'fatwa' (religious sanctioning) by a government of the Republic, for the first time in the history of the Republic, is no mere coincidence. The reason behind relinquishing national education to a coalition of "Turkish-Islam synthesizers" and sharia supporters can also be discerned when we adopt the broader view.

Our colleagues, Ugur Mumcu and others who have contributed to the unearthing of the affair in its full dimensions, shun sensationalist journalism. And CUMHURIYET's objective is to draw attention to the dangers rather than exposing a few individuals here and there. The point in reiterating all this is our observation that the affair is assuming an air of a detective story and the full dimensions of the incident is in danger of being lost on us.

It really does not matter all that much, even if all those responsible for Rabitagate are identified, or relations with Rabita are severed and measures taken to prevent its recurrence. After viewing the whole affair in its overall context it should be necessary to review the whole matter from the start to finish: The Ataturk Supreme Council issue, compulsory religion courses, The number of schools for religious functionaries, the unity of education principle, and its re-application, cleansing of

national education from sharia supporters, disclosure of the real aims behind Turkish-Islam synthesis and so on.

Unless these are done no amount of measures or speeches can be effective or meaningful in the face of the threat directed at the fundamentals of the Republic. For Heaven's sake, let us not lose sight of the fact that Rabitagate is but one part of a bigger whole!

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